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Abstract 
 
The Effects of the Texas School Property Tax Abatement Program on 
Public School Finance 
 
Megan Ashley Randall, MSCRP and MPAff 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2016 
 
Supervisor:  Michael Oden 
 
This report explores the relationship between school property tax abatements, property 
wealth, and industrial firm siting in Texas. Texas adopted its school property tax abatement 
program, known as Chapter 313, in 2001. This report employs a mixed-methods approach 
to evaluate the factors that predict districts’ participation in the Chapter 313 program in 
Texas, as well as to assess abatements’ effect on industrial firm investment. The study is 
modeled after an evaluation of the Indiana school property tax abatement program 
conducted by Dalehite in 2005. Using a quasi-experimental, propensity score matching 
research design, I find that industrial property wealth predicts abatement program 
participation throughout the lifespan of the program. A district’s donor status in the state’s 
redistributive school finance system as well as its urban status predict abatement program 
participation early in the program’s operation from 2003-2007. Lastly, I find no evidence 
of a relationship between abatement participation and growth in industrial property values. 
Findings suggest that some features of the Chapter 313 program may exacerbate inequity 
and confer a disproportionate share of benefits, such as payments-in-lieu of taxes and state 
  vii 
aid subsidies, to property-wealthy districts. Moreover, the state is currently investing 
billions of dollars into the program without evidence that these investments produce the 
intended industrial property investment in Texas communities.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This report explores the relationship between school property tax abatements, 
property wealth, and industrial firm siting in Texas. Texas adopted its school property tax 
abatement program (also known as “Chapter 313”) in 2001, in response to the state’s 
declining rate of industrial firm attraction. Chapter 313 authorizes districts to grant tax 
breaks to firms that locate in their jurisdiction in exchange for property investment and job 
creation. Since the program’s inception, lawmakers, advocates, and stakeholders have 
debated its efficacy – and its effects on the public school finance system, which bears full 
cost of the program via the state school aid formulas.  
In this report, I use a mixed-methods approach to examine whether property-rich 
districts are more likely to grant tax abatements and whether those abatements are 
associated with growth in districts’ industrial property tax base. Policymakers and 
advocates have criticized Texas’ Chapter 313 program for creating a system of perverse 
incentives that encourages districts to enter into abatement agreements at the expense of 
the state school finance system. Texas allocates state funding to school districts through an 
aid formula based on district need and the size of its property tax base.1 The state covers a 
larger percentage of per pupil costs for districts with lower revenue capacity. As a district’s 
property tax base increases, it can expect to pay a larger share of its own costs through its 
local property tax revenue (Texas Taxpayers and Research Association, 2012).  
                                                 
1 The Texas school finance system is multi-layered. This report focuses on the portion of funding allocated 
through the Foundation School Program, which is designed to equalize resources across districts based on 
need and revenue capacity. Additional funding is allocated through the “target revenue system,” instituted 
in 2006. For more information, see Texas Taxpayers and Research Association, 2012. 
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When calculating a district’s taxable property value for state school aid purposes, 
however, the state excludes the value of abated property, thus allowing districts to grant 
tax breaks to firms without experiencing any loss in state school aid. Districts, therefore, 
have little disincentive to offer abatements, since the state continues to pay the same 
percentage of per pupil costs as before the abatement. If, contrary to current policy, the 
value of Chapter 313 abatements was not exempted from assigned taxable value, the state 
school aid formulas would reflect the resultant growth in the district’s property tax base 
and the district would receive reduced state aid. Prior to Chapter 313, the state did not 
exempt the value of school property tax abatements from district aid calculations. 
Compounding the school aid incentives, Texas permits districts to accept side 
payments from firms (known as payments-in-lieu-of-taxes, or PILOTs) outside of the 
school property tax system entirely. These payments are negotiated voluntarily between 
the district and firm and are not included in the calculations for state school aid, creating 
yet another avenue by which districts may artificially deflate their revenue capacity in the 
state aid formula. Moreover, the public school finance system contains mechanisms to 
equalize property wealth across districts. The state recaptures revenue from property-rich 
(i.e. “Chapter 41”) districts to redistribute to property-poor districts in what is known as 
the 1993 “Robin Hood Plan.” PILOT payments exist outside of the property tax system 
entirely and as such are not subject to redistribution under Chapter 41. Districts are 
permitted to, in effect, trade property tax revenues (which are subject to school aid formula 
and redistribution requirements) for PILOT payments that are not subject to those 
requirements – and the districts experience no loss in state aid for participating in these 
agreements. 
Given the material benefits that the program confers to both firms and participating 
districts, it is relevant to ask whether the state is disproportionately subsidizing wealthier 
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districts and whether, in turn, those subsidies are producing even greater levels of property 
wealth in those districts. In 2005, Dalehite conducted a study of the school property tax 
abatement program in Indiana, finding that abatements are more likely to be granted for 
wealthier school districts. He found, furthermore, that abatements are associated with 
growth in districts’ personal property tax base, which he uses as a proxy for industrial 
property investment. 
 Indiana’s abatement program works by exempting a diminishing portion of abated 
property from taxation, over the course of the abatement agreement. At the end of the 
abatement period, all property becomes fully taxable. The abatement program, therefore, 
has important implications for districts’ tax base if it contributes to property value growth. 
Dalehite concludes that Indiana’s economic development policy contradicts one of the 
major objective of the state’s public school finance system, which is to mitigate disparities 
in property wealth across districts. Wealthier districts are more likely to participate in the 
program, and thus to experience growth in their tax base as a result of their participation. 
This report provides results from a partial replication of Dalehite’s 2005 study on 
the Indiana abatement program. I aim to elucidate: 1) the factors that influence abatement 
participation in Texas, and whether property wealth predicts participation; and 2) the 
effects of abatement participation on districts’ industrial property tax base. I employ a 
quasi-experimental propensity score matching model to explore each of these questions 
and contextualize quantitative findings with data from a survey of district officials in 
Chapter 313 districts. From my findings, I draw inferences about the efficacy of the 
program and its relationship to the wealth equalization components of the school finance 
system.  
The report begins with a review of the literature on tax abatements – their history, 
factors that influence participation, and their efficacy. I then discuss the history and design 
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of Texas’ school property tax abatement program, specifically. I review Chapter 313’s 
intersection with the school finance system and highlight recent policy debates in Texas. 
These introductory chapters provide foundation and framing for the research questions that 
I explore in Chapters 4 through 6. 
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the quantitative and qualitative methodologies 
that I use to examine Texas’ abatement program. I review my modeling strategy, regression 
equations, and variables, as well as my survey methodology. In Chapter 5, I discuss 
findings from the quantitative regression analysis. I evaluate the variables that influence 
districts’ program participation for three separate study periods: 2003-2007, 2003-2014, 
and 2008-2014. I then present findings from the abatement outcome model and discuss the 
relationship between abatement participation and changes in industrial property 
investment.  
Chapter 6 synthesizes the results of the regression analysis with qualitative data 
from a survey of school district officials and presents comprehensive findings on the 
program. I conclude that existing industrial property wealth predicts abatement 
participation, with potentially deleterious effects on equity in the public school finance 
system. Second, I conclude that a district’s Chapter 41 status predicts participation in early 
years and corroborate this finding with district officials’ survey responses. District officials 
routinely indicate that the abatement program, and in particular the allowance of PILOTs, 
makes the program especially attractive to Chapter 41 districts. This finding suggests that 
the state may wish to reevaluate its policy of allowing districts to enter into PILOTs, given 
their potential to confer disparate benefits to wealthier districts. 
Thirdly, I find no evidence of a relationship between abatement participation and 
growth in the industrial property tax base, despite this being a primary motivation for 
district officials’ decision to enter into abatement agreements. This finding suggests that 
  5 
the state may be investing significant funding into a program that has no demonstrable 
effect on industrial investment.  
Limitations imposed by the data and study design preclude making any conclusive 
statements about the program. However, findings from this analysis suggest that additional 
research is needed on the redistributive implications and economic efficacy of the program. 
There is currently insufficient evidence to conclude that the state’s investment in the 
program, and the resultant fiscal losses imposed on the school finance system, are 
producing the desired economic effect. Moreover, the patterns in the data represent 
potential distributional inequities that may undermine the wealth equalization objectives of 
the school finance system. I recommend pursuing additional quantitative program 
evaluation as well as further qualitative assessment of district officials’ experience with the 
program. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Peer-reviewed literature on economic development incentives presents diverse 
findings on the factors that influence abatement participation and the effect of abatements 
on firm siting. A sizable body of policy literature, moreover, expresses skepticism about 
the purported benefits of abatement participation and is concerned with negative effects on 
state public finance. The academic literature often treats economic development incentives 
as a homogeneous body of interventions – failing to distinguish between different types of 
incentive programs or diversity in program design. Moreover, few authors treat school 
property tax abatements separately from municipal abatements, and the literature on school 
property tax abatements, specifically, is scarce.  
In this literature review, I present an overview of the history, efficacy, and 
predictors of participation in tax abatement programs. I address competing perspectives on 
abatements from advocacy groups and local economic development practitioners. 
Ultimately, literature suggests that the differing interests of state and local jurisdictions, 
combined with common abatement design features, creates potential for such programs to 
benefit local jurisdictions to the detriment of the state’s public finance system. Findings 
from this literature review will help frame and contextualize the research questions that I 
explore in ensuing chapters of this report. 
HISTORY OF TAX ABATEMENTS 
States have used tax abatements throughout the twentieth century to compete for a 
scarce national supply of jobs and overcome regional economic disadvantages. Dalehite, 
Mikesell, and Zorn (2005) claim that the first documented abatement programs are found 
in Mississippi and Louisiana as early as 1936. Southern states enacted abatement programs 
in an early attempt to compete for jobs in an industrial economy and overcome the 
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limitations of historic underdevelopment and an unskilled workforce relative to the 
Northeastern and Midwestern regions of the US (Dalehite, Mikesell, and Zorn, 2005, 158).  
Similarly, literature characterizes the recent proliferation of abatements as a 
response to the United States’ shift away from a manufacturing economy in the latter half 
of the twentieth century (Wilson, 1993; Kenyon, Langley, and Paquin, 2012; Dalehite, 
Mikesell, and Zorn, 2005). The 1970s brought a wave of deindustrialization to the United 
States that magnified interstate competition (Wilson, 1993). The northern state economies 
suffered due to their heavy reliance on declining manufacturing sectors, while southern 
states lacked the skilled workforce necessary to compete for high-wage jobs in the new 
service-driven economy (Wilson, 1993).  
Amidst these structural economic changes, the Illinois Manufacturing Association 
commissioned the first ranking of state business climates in 1975, contributing to the new 
era of interstate competition for industrial jobs (Wilson 1993, 99). Business climate 
rankings multiplied during this period. Early rankings, as Wilson explains, were heavily 
reliant on public policy indicators, such as tax rates, and often ignored the importance of 
numerous regional locational factors in firm siting. Despite these weaknesses, the new 
ratings placed state tax policy under heavy scrutiny from both the industrial sector and 
public. 
The shrinking supply of manufacturing jobs, combined with a strong public focus 
on the policy drivers of business climate, placed pressure on states to lower their tax rates. 
States across the country founded Blue Ribbon Commissions to study opportunities for 
enhancing interstate competitiveness (Wilson, 1993). In Texas in 1981, for example, the 
governor formed the Texas 2000 commission, which he tasked with producing 
recommendations for diversifying the state’s economy in an increasingly competitive 
business climate (Wilson, 1993, 106). 
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Kenyon, Langley, and Paquin (2012) identify increasing firm mobility as another 
contributor to the contemporary proliferation of tax incentives. Improvements in 
telecommunications and transportation in the 1970s and 1980s, they suggest, reduced 
firms’ transportation costs and increased their locational mobility. This mobility made 
firms “more sensitive to costs that vary by location, such as labor and taxes” (Kenyon, 
Langley, and Paquin, 2012, 5). Kenyon, Langley, and Paquin propose that the 41% decline 
in manufacturing jobs since 1978 contributed to an increase in tax abatements as states 
strove to remain competitive in a global marketplace (Kenyon, Langley, and Paquin, 2012, 
5).  
Dalehite, Mikesell, and Zorn (2005) find that the number of states with tax 
abatement programs grew from 15 to 35 between the years of 1964 and 2005. Tax 
abatement programs, therefore, represent an increasingly popular tool for states to advance 
their economic development goals. Interstate competition has historically driven the 
adoption of abatement programs at the state level and this remains true of Texas’ current 
school tax abatement program (see Chapter 3). The expanding use of tax abatements 
nationally warrants examination. Literature often asks whether these programs achieve 
their goal of attracting industrial investment or are detrimental to state or local public 
finance.  
FACTORS INFLUENCING ABATEMENT PARTICIPATION 
Pragmatically, tax abatement programs often focus on property tax relief and are 
therefore administered at the local level. The role of local jurisdictions in abatement 
decision-making thus remains an important consideration in program evaluation. States 
often authorize municipalities, counties and school districts to make decisions about 
whether to grant abatements. Overlapping jurisdictional authority creates the potential for 
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contradictory program objectives at the state and local level. The state’s goal is to enhance 
its inter-state competitiveness. However, because the jurisdictional authority for granting 
property tax abatements exists at the local level, the program may in reality drive intra-
state competition between local jurisdictions. 
Local jurisdictions are semi-autonomous entities whose own interests may not 
always align with the state’s. Understanding the factors that influence local jurisdictions’ 
participation in an abatement program can help illuminate areas where the program may 
produce unintended outcomes. The intergovernmental effects of tax policies are of 
particular importance for programs that rely on revenues from multiple jurisdictions, such 
as public k-12 education.  
Dalehite (2005) performs a comprehensive literature review on the factors that 
influence abatement adoption at the local level. Since this report presents a partial 
replication of Dalehite’s study in Texas, this literature review will focus on the fiscal 
variables that Dalehite highlights as central to his program evaluation. Understanding the 
factors influencing abatement adoption at the local level may help identify whether some 
jurisdictions bear a disproportionate share of the benefit or burden from abatement 
programs. 
Fiscal Influencers 
The following sections elaborate on the fiscal factors that inform Dalehite’s 2005 
program evaluation and the variables that I include in my regression model. 
Fiscal  Stress Hypothesis 
The fiscal stress hypothesis posits that local jurisdictions offer tax abatements when 
they are struggling fiscally (Dalehite, 2005, 21). When jurisdictions lack sufficient revenue 
to pay for necessary public services, this theory states, they offer abatements in an attempt 
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to attract mobile capital to their jurisdiction. Jurisdictions hope that these abatements will 
increase the property tax base and help raise necessary revenue. Dalehite highlights a body 
of literature providing evidence for this hypothesis, including Bowman & Pagano (1992), 
Pagano & Bowman (1995), Man and Rosentraub (1998), and Wassmer (1992). 
Often left out of the discussion on fiscal effects of abatement participation are the 
fiscal costs associated with employee migration to the region. Bartik (2004) maintains that 
eight in ten new jobs created through economic development incentives go to employees 
who would have otherwise lived elsewhere (Bartik, 2004, 8). While jurisdictions may offer 
economic development incentives with an eye toward improving their fiscal capacity, the 
reality is that firms locating in the jurisdiction will act as a population draw, and the 
jurisdiction will incur additional service costs associated with this migration – e.g. 
infrastructure needs, education costs, healthcare costs, or any other public services that the 
new population will access. Thus, while the tax base for the jurisdiction might expand, “the 
benefit and cost numbers work out so that benefits and costs are of roughly similar 
magnitude” (Bartik, 2004, 9). 
Should the fiscal stress hypothesis hold, then communities with higher tax rates 
would be more likely to grant abatements, after controlling for taxable property value 
(Dalehite, 2005, 64). Similarly, communities that experience a decline in state or federal 
funding would also be expected to have higher rates of tax abatement (Dalehite, 2005, 64). 
Fiscal Health Hypothesis 
In contrast, some scholars posit that jurisdictions offer abatements when they are 
fiscally healthy. Cities with sound fiscal management, this theory articulates, are more 
likely to have strong public and community leadership. City officials are able to leverage 
the city’s fiscal health to enhance its competitive edge (cited in Dalehite, 2005, 24-25). 
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Fiscally healthy cities, as Dalehite explains, may be more attractive to firms and may thus 
be in a position to offer smaller, but more frequent, abatements to attract firms. 
Dalehite finds this hypothesis corroborated in Anderson & Wassmer (1995), who 
demonstrate that high-tax communities resist abatement pressures, and Reese (1992), who 
finds that growing cities are more likely to offer abatements (Dalehite, 2005, 25). This 
hypothesis would be evidenced in the data if communities with lower tax rates, or other 
indicators of fiscal health, display higher rates of abatement. 
Fiscal Zoning Hypothesis 
Related to the fiscal stress hypothesis, the fiscal zoning hypothesis articulates that 
jurisdictions offer abatements when they believe the abatements will confer fiscal benefits 
to the jurisdiction and are willing to make trade-offs on land use (Dalehite, 2005, 25). Local 
jurisdictions would require fiscal benefits to, at minimum, exceed the loss of environmental 
quality from siting industrial production in their community. Desire for environmental 
quality is income elastic, Dalehite explains, and as communities become wealthier they 
will be less likely to trade environmental quality for lower taxes or other fiscal benefits. 
Areas that are low-income, high-crime or otherwise experiencing blight associated with 
underutilized land may be more likely to make this trade-off. Dalehite cites Fischel (1975), 
White (1975), and Wassmer (1989, 1991, and 1992). 
Welfare Maximizing and Additional Hypotheses 
While this study, modeled on Dalehite’s, focuses on the fiscal variables at play in 
local abatement decisions, several additional hypotheses are worth touching upon. The 
welfare maximizing hypothesis posits that jurisdictions want to attract firms that they 
anticipate will broadly improve the welfare of their residents – fiscally or otherwise 
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(Dalehite, 2005, 22). For example, communities may seek to attract firms that can create 
job opportunities while also meeting local demand for goods. 
In his canonical 1990 piece on development incentives, Bartik recommends that 
policymakers take a “market failure” approach to economic development policy. He 
suggests that jurisdictions can maximize welfare by intervening only when the private 
market is structurally inclined to underinvest in a good that is critical to the development 
of the region (Bartik, 1990). A broad focus on simply jobs, he suggests, will likely result 
in jurisdictions overinvesting in jobs that the private market would have produced absent 
government intervention. This perspective is important to consider when thinking through 
contemporary economic development policy initiatives, as many critics ask whether state 
governments are spending money to attract firms that would have located in a region 
regardless of the incentive. If this is the case, and incentives are not required to create the 
jobs and investment desired by state policymakers, then the public sector is overinvesting 
in these goods – with resultant welfare losses throughout the system.  
Bartik suggests that policymakers would better maximize welfare by directing 
public resources toward areas where the market fails to produce the desired results, such 
as with involuntary unemployment, underemployment, agglomeration economies, skilled 
human capital, as well as research and innovation. The market failure approach to 
maximizing welfare does have some limitations, namely that it does not always precisely 
account for non-market or social benefits, distributional effects, or the effects of one 
region’s policy on neighboring areas (Bartik, 1990, 368). Bartik recognizes that 
maximizing welfare for one region may negatively affect welfare in neighboring areas. 
Policies can also, however, create positive spillover effects (such as with research and 
development) that maximizes welfare overall. Therefore, governments should pay close 
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attention to whether their policies are targeted toward market underinvestment and whether 
they are likely to produce net positive welfare effects across regions. 
Also in the welfare-driven approach to economic development, Byrnes, Marvel, 
and Sridhar (1999) examine the generosity of local abatements. They find that abatement 
generosity is positively related to job creation and quality of firms’ credit scores, 
suggesting that jurisdictions at least try to grant abatements that are good fiscal deals for 
local residents. This hypothesis suggests that jurisdictions exercise leverage and negotiate 
with firms on behalf of their residents. Local governments do not passively provide 
abatements out of fiscal desperation, but use them as tools to actively negotiate for 
enhanced welfare of their citizens. This is in contrast to the “business wins” model of 
abatement adoption, which hypothesizes that jurisdictions do not negotiate from a place of 
strength due to political pressure and information asymmetries (see citations in Byrnes, 
Marvel and Sridhar, 1999, 809). 
Additional hypotheses are either political or economic. Some literature suggests 
that cities with a mayor are more likely to adopt abatements – with effects more powerful 
during election years (see citation in Byrnes, Marvel and Sridhar, 1999). In 2008, Dalehite, 
Mikesell, and Zorn concluded that abatements have such a negligible impact on tax rates 
that they fail to spark public opposition, and so politicians use them as a symbolic tool to 
garner political support.  
Dalehite highlights research suggesting that some jurisdictions use abatement 
programs to build “agglomeration economies.” Some jurisdictions believe that offering 
abatements to multiple sector-specific firms will create incentives for additional firms to 
cluster in the community. This will, they hope, produce beneficial spillover effects for the 
area (cited in Dalehite, 2005, 22). Bartik (1990) suggests that it is reasonable for a 
government to intervene in order to create an agglomeration economy. Lastly, some 
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literature suggests that when neighboring or overlapping jurisdictions offer abatements, 
this increases the long-term likelihood of abatement adoption in the primary jurisdiction. 
This is known as the copycat hypothesis and is explored in Anderson and Wassmer (1995) 
as well as Wassmer and Anderson (2001). Wilson (1999) offers a review of the literature 
on tax competition among independent governments, concluding that competition is 
typically associated with wasteful spending and welfare losses. His review of the research 
supports the “race to the bottom” hypothesis, positing that tax competition results in 
“inefficiently low taxes” and levels of public goods (Wilson 1999, 298). 
This report seeks to identify the variables that are most predictive of abatement 
participation for school districts in Texas. I intend for findings from the quantitative portion 
of this report to add to the body of literature on predictors of abatement participation and 
inform policy discussions about Chapter 313 in Texas. 
ABATEMENT EFFICACY AND INDUSTRIAL FIRM SITING 
Literature provides mixed, but largely skeptical, findings as to whether tax 
abatements are effective instruments to induce firm siting. In their reviews of the literature 
on abatement efficacy, both Dalehite (2005, 29) and Kenyon, Langley, and Paquin (2012, 
26) identify three means by which academics have evaluated the effect of local tax policy 
on firm siting: 1) firm surveys; 2) econometric regression analysis; and 3) representative 
or hypothetical firm models. The first two approaches are empirical, and the third is based 
on modeling a firm’s behavior through economic theory. This report takes an empirical 
approach and will thus focus on findings from the empirical literature.  
The primary empirical challenge in assessing the efficacy of abatements is the 
endogeneity of the dependent variable – that is, taxing jurisdictions may grant abatements 
to firms that have already decided to locate within the jurisdiction due to other factors, 
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thereby muddying the causal relationship between abatements and economic growth. Early 
attempts to clarify this causal relationship suggest that abatements do not heavily influence 
siting, while some recent evaluations have suggested that tax incentives may be influential 
under certain conditions. Studies on the influence of local tax policy on firm siting employ 
a variety of methodologies, evaluate a diverse array of incentive policies (not always 
limited to tax abatements), and differ in whether they explore inter or intraregional 
competition. 
Firm Surveys 
The firm survey approach elucidates the relationship between tax policy and siting 
decisions by asking firm representatives to identify factors that are, or have been, 
influential in their location decisions. Dalehite, for example, cites Ross’ 1953 study of tax 
exemptions in Louisiana as early evidence of tax incentives’ weak influence on firm siting. 
Through survey data, Ross concludes that the overwhelming majority of investments 
(93%) would have been made regardless of the tax break. Morse and Farmer (1986), 
similarly, evaluate Ohio’s property tax abatement program via a firm survey and find that 
abatements likely influence only 25% of local investment.  
However, Morse and Farmer also find that – even with this underwhelming 
investment percentage – the abatement program still exceeds cities’ breakeven threshold 
by threefold, largely due to state aid policies that reimburse school districts for lost revenue. 
While numerous studies, including this report, focus on the influence of tax abatements on 
firm siting decisions, siting is only one component of program efficacy. Morse and 
Farmer’s work shows that abatement program design can shift the cost-benefit outcome 
such that cities find the program beneficial even when the majority of investment would 
have occurred regardless. 
  16 
Contemporary survey data continue to highlight the insignificance of taxes 
compared to other regional factors in firm siting decisions. In Area Development’s 29th 
Survey of Corporate Executives, state and local tax incentives ranked only 11th on the list 
of locational factors important to firms. They ranked behind more influential factors such 
as highway proximity, occupancy and construction costs, availability of land, and 
availability of skilled labor, for example (Area Development, 2015).  
Dalehite, in discussing the theory behind locational decision-making, cites 
Schmenner (1982), who posits that business siting occurs in three stages: 1) making the 
decision to invest, at which point taxes are irrelevant; 2) making the decision to locate in a 
specific state or region, at which point local tax benefits become more important but are 
still secondary to regional factors; and 3) making the decision to locate at a specific site, at 
which point regional factors are likely equivalent across local jurisdictions and taxes can 
thus become the marginal tipping point in a firm’s decision to invest. 
Econometric Analyses 
In the econometric literature, Kenyon, Langley, and Paquin (2012) highlight the 
research of Bartik (1991) and Wasylenko (1997) as evidence that abatements do not affect 
interregional firm siting decisions (Kenyon, Langley, and Paquin, 2012, 26). Their meta-
analysis of empirical abatement evaluations finds that differences in the tax climate within 
regions have a five to ten times greater effect on economic activity than differences in taxes 
between regions. Wilson affirms this conclusion (1993, 120), asserting that tax abatements 
have a greater impact on firm siting and economic development intra-regionally than they 
do inter-regionally. Coffin’s analysis (1982) corroborates these findings, concluding that 
there is insufficient evidence from econometric analysis to assert that property tax 
incentives influence firm siting.  
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While there is little literature available on the efficacy of tax abatement programs 
in Texas, specifically, Zamudio (2004) presents an econometric analysis of municipal 
abatements in El Paso, Texas. He concludes that municipal abatements have not resulted 
in improved economic performance. His results confirm findings from previous empirical 
work on El Paso (Fullerton, 2002). Their findings suggest that Texas policymakers should 
question the assumption that abatements induce investment, especially when Texas 
continues to invest public dollars into local abatement agreements.  
The empirical narrative, therefore, presents conditional findings as to whether 
abatements help to attract or retain firms. Moreover, this body of literature suggests that 
the jurisdictional level of analysis is important when evaluating abatement policies. Several 
empirical evaluations conclude that abatement decisions can influence economic 
development activity at the intra-regional but not the inter-regional or state level. This 
highlights the contradictions inherent in state-level tax abatement programs. The state’s 
intention may be to attract firms to the state that would have otherwise gone elsewhere. 
However, a sizable body of empirical literature suggests that tax abatements are not likely 
to be a major decision-making factor when firms are selecting between state and regional 
locations.  
Taxes can be an effective tool to drive siting at the local level. However, intra-
regional competition is not necessarily consistent with the state’s economic goals. In fact, 
intraregional competition may undermine the state public finance system if it causes a “race 
to the bottom” among jurisdictions, or if it reduces revenue for services funded from both 
state and local coffers, such as public education. If the previously cited copycat effect holds 
true, then abatements will inherently proliferate as local jurisdictions rush to compete with 
neighboring jurisdictions. Concern over this oft-referenced “race to the bottom” undergirds 
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much of the popular debate about incentives. The next section discusses the contemporary 
debate between policy advocates and economic development practitioners on these issues. 
CONTEMPORARY POLICY DEBATES 
Mixed findings from the literature support a skeptical outlook on abatements among 
policy analysts and advocates. Advocates have expressed concern about the proliferation 
of tax abatements and have criticized locally-driven (but state-funded) economic 
development policy. A core concern is that a disproportionate share of economic benefits 
is accruing to private firms from abatements, while the burden of abatements is 
disproportionately being borne by the public. There is special concern about how 
abatements affect the sustainability of programs that rely on multi-jurisdictional revenue 
sources, such as public education. 
Private Benefit, Public Burden 
Advocacy groups are concerned that abatement programs benefit private firms at 
the expense of the public. Good Jobs First, a national economic policy advocacy group, is 
outspoken in its criticism of state and local economic development incentives. The 
organization expresses concern that these programs have a deleterious effect on local and 
state public finance, conferring large benefits to corporations without sufficient 
accountability. Good Jobs First Executive Director Greg LeRoy’s 2005 book, entitled The 
Great American Jobs Scam, makes the advocates’ case for limiting the use of, and bringing 
more public accountability to, abatement programs. LeRoy describes marquee cases in 
which firms received large public subsidies in the form of tax abatements only to 
underperform on job creation benchmarks, go bankrupt after receiving an abatement, or 
otherwise fail to provide a sufficient return to the public on its investment.  
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LeRoy says, regarding school tax abatements, “The bottom line: when a company 
gets an abatement…less money goes into the local hopper for schools” (LeRoy, 2005, 116). 
This quote encapsulates one of the primary criticisms of abatements from the progressive 
advocacy community: incentives reduce revenue for public services while imposing 
additional costs on the public, such as the cost to educate children of new employees who 
have moved to the district to fill new job openings. Local and state governments, they posit, 
should evaluate the broader costs associated with unproven economic development policies 
(Bressler and Top, 2009; LeRoy, 2005; Lavine, 2013). This is especially true when 
abatements result in reduced revenues for programs such as public education. Whereas 
private firms and local jurisdictions may see abatement programs as an opportunity to 
incentivize local economic investment, many progressive advocates see them as reducing 
funding for public education and increasing the burden on the public finance system. 
Pragmatic and Effective 
Speaking from the economic developer and local practitioner perspective, Coan 
(2012) offers a rebuttal to the skepticism of academics and advocates. Why, he posits, 
would local communities continue to offer abatements if they were, in fact, so detrimental 
to the wellbeing of the community. The answer, he proposes, is that abatement programs 
are neither detrimental nor irrational. Coan posits that local policymakers and economic 
development officials must respond to both political and economic pressures. He maintains 
that abatement polices are efficient mechanisms to incentivize intra-regional siting 
decisions in a way that benefits communities. 
In his article “Confessions of a Serial Tax Abater,” he claims that much of the 
academic research fails to properly distinguish between different types of abatements and 
therefore paints abatements with too broad a brush. Academics are not well-attuned to the 
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dilemma faced by local economic development professionals or policymakers, he 
postulates. In the practitioner context, denying an abatement is a risky move that can mean 
real economic loss for a community. Local communities have good reasons for adopting 
abatements, he argues, and continuing to paint jurisdictions as irrational for utilizing this 
tool – despite its obvious popularity – is short-sighted. 
Interestingly, the diverging perspectives of advocates and local practitioners on 
abatement programs confirm findings from the academic literature. Abatements, much of 
the literature finds, can and do influence firm siting intra-regionally. They are unlikely, 
however, to alter investment decisions at the inter-regional or state level. The competing 
perspectives expressed by state or federal-level advocates and local economic development 
practitioners highlight the importance of jurisdictional interests. Abatement programs that 
are considered popular and practical among elected officials at the local level may not serve 
the interests of the larger region, state, or even country. Similarly, practices that are 
maligned by academic scholars may serve the interests of some local jurisdictions very 
well. This reality may produce tension between local and state interests and create political 
barriers to program reform, as can be seen in Texas.  
The Importance of Program Design 
Many policy analysts – if not critical of abatement programs as a whole – are critical 
of program design that incentivizes local jurisdictions to make decisions that are costly to 
the state. These program design features incentivize jurisdictions to forgo revenue without 
internalizing the cost. Morse and Farmer (1986), in their peer-reviewed paper on the topic, 
find that tax abatements are cost-effective for jurisdictions, and that it is rational for local 
jurisdictions to grant them. However, this finding only holds true when the state absorbs 
the cost of the abatement by reimbursing local school districts for lost revenue. 
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Programmatic design forcing the jurisdiction to internalize the cost would actually render 
abatements cost-ineffective. Morse and Farmer conclude that hiding the true cost of 
abatements from local jurisdictions will lead to a heavier use of abatements, to the ultimate 
detriment of the state public finance system.  
Given the tensions between competing jurisdictional interests, and the rapid 
proliferation of abatement programs despite limited evidence of efficacy, policy literature 
often provides program design recommendations.  Kenyon, Langley, and Paquin (2012), 
of the Lincoln Land Institute, express skepticism about the efficacy of abatement programs. 
Recognizing the ubiquity of these programs, however, they offer recommendations for how 
state and local governments can improve program design. For state actors, they 
recommend: 1) targeting abatements to areas experiencing economic hardship; 2) requiring 
that incentives be approved by all affected jurisdictions; 3) removing perverse incentives 
by penalizing, rather than subsidizing, jurisdictions that offer abatements; and 4) publishing 
more data, and otherwise increasing transparency and accountability measures. 
Dalehite, Mikesell, and Zorn (2005) review the design of abatement programs state-
by-state. They conclude that abatement design is diverse and many states are not employing 
best practices. They find that, on average, abatement programs in the United States are too 
generous and contain insufficient oversight or evaluation. Many state programs offer 
abatements for property classes or projects that will be unlikely to yield sustainable 
economic benefit, and many do not contain clawback provisions or other accountability 
mechanisms to protect the state’s investment. The authors recommend that states tighten 
program regulations and accountability measures to enhance program performance and 
protect public investment. 
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Cost-benefit Evaluations 
Policymakers at all levels of government are beginning to adopt changes to program 
design in order to improve program accountability and efficacy. In particular, some cities 
are beginning to adopt more rigorous cost-benefit frameworks for evaluating and granting 
tax abatements to firms. As discussed previously, abatement programs can be evaluated on 
their ability to influence firm siting as well as their net cost to the community granting the 
abatement. There is considerable ambiguity in the literature as to whether the economic 
benefits of granting an abatement outweigh the costs. Many jurisdictions granting 
abatements fail to perform rigorous evaluations of the ultimate costs and benefits of 
offering a tax break to a firm. There are potential costs associated with granting an 
abatement in addition to the lost tax revenue. Granting an abatement to a large firm may 
result in population growth, an increased need for services, and rising public school 
enrollment – all of which place pressure on the jurisdiction’s financial resources (Gamkhar 
and Granof, 2008). 
Some jurisdictions are beginning to adopt more rigorous cost-benefit evaluation 
policies in order to guard against costly abatement deals. In 2008, Dr. Michael Oden of the 
University of Texas at Austin made a series of recommendations for the City of Austin to 
improve its firm-based tax incentive program. In the bevy of comprehensive 
recommendations contained in his report, he proposes that Austin adopt a rigorous cost-
benefit analysis policy as part of its abatement evaluation process (Oden, 2008). Following 
the report, the city adopted this recommendation and now employs a cost-benefit matrix 
evaluation to each abatement application.  
Transparency and GASB 77 
In recent years, significant momentum has been building for additional disclosure 
and transparency requirements in tax abatement programs. In 2013, Good Jobs First praised 
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Austin, Texas, for its abatement transparency (McIlvain, Mattera, and LeRoy, 2013). The 
city scored full points in the Good Jobs First abatement disclosure and transparency 
evaluation (McIlvain, Mattera, and LeRoy, 2013). 
In a major step towards increased transparency, the Governmental Accounting 
Standards Board (GASB) issued Statement No. 77 in August, 2015. This statement newly 
requires all jurisdictions to disclose the tax abatements that they grant, or that have been 
granted by another jurisdiction but which will affect the reporting entity’s revenues. 
Governments are required to comply with this new accounting standard for periods and 
statements following December 15, 2015. 
In a report preceding the issue of the statement, GASB Board Member Dr. Michael 
Granof and Dr. Shama Gamkhar at the University of Texas at Austin made the case for 
treating tax abatements as a type of local tax expenditure. Abatements should be fully 
disclosed, they state, in order to: 1) ensure the public’s access to clear information about 
the financial position of governmental entities; 2) effectively evaluate and monitor the 
contractual abatement arrangements between the governmental entity and the firm; and 3) 
effectively perform cost-benefit analyses of the program.  
It remains to be seen what effect the national GASB rule will have on the 
proliferation of abatements locally, and whether local jurisdictions will be less inclined to 
grant large abatements if they must disclose them as expenditures. In 2015, the Urban 
Institute published a paper highlighting potential issues with compliance, including lack of 
internal auditing capacity by local governments. The paper anticipates that the rule will 
provide the public with access to valuable additional information about abatements in local 
communities (Francis, 2015). 
Policy debates regarding school property tax abatements in Texas are similar to 
those happening on the national stage, or in other states. Discussions over jurisdictional 
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authority, transparency, and the relative cost-benefit of the Texas abatement program occur 
during each legislative session in which the program comes up for reauthorization. The 
research findings in this report will hopefully contribute to the body of evidence-based 
policy knowledge on the efficacy of abatement programs. 
SCHOOL PROPERTY TAX ABATEMENTS 
Property tax abatement programs can affect the portion of local taxes that goes 
toward municipalities, counties, or school districts – or all of the above. A school property 
tax abatement applies to that portion of local property taxes that funds the local public 
school district. Since school taxes comprise such a large percentage of property taxes – 55 
percent in Texas in 2013 (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2014) – school property 
tax abatements can significantly reduce a firm’s tax burden. While literature on economic 
development incentives and tax abatement programs is expansive, literature on school 
property tax abatements is scarce. Some academic literature discusses the intersection of 
school finance and tax abatement programs (Morse and Farmer, 1986), but this material is 
the exception rather than rule. 
In 2003, the National Education Association (NEA) commissioned Good Jobs First 
to produce a report examining school property tax abatement programs state-to-state and 
exploring their implications for public school finance. The report found that, in 2003, 25 
states allowed jurisdictions to abate school property taxes. Only 5 states prohibited local 
jurisdictions from abating school property taxes (National Education Association, 2003, 
13). The report, importantly, found that very few states granted school districts the 
autonomy to approve an abatement. In 2003, only five states gave school boards formal 
authority to approve or reject a proposed abatement – among them, Texas. Texas and 
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Pennsylvania were unique in granting school boards full authority over school property tax 
abatements.  
Thus, in many states, school property tax abatement programs exclude school 
boards from the decision-making process entirely, allowing cities and counties to abate 
school property taxes without input from the district whose revenues will be affected. This 
policy can cause discord between local government and school district officials, especially 
when the abating city or county negotiates supplemental payments from the firm that they 
are not required to share with the school district. Advocates have raised this issue in Jersey 
City, for example, where the city grants large tax abatements to fund commercial 
developments, reducing revenues for the local school district. The city then accepts 
supplemental payments from firms that it does not share with the schools (Bressler and 
Top, 2009). Advocates complain that school districts, which do not have a say in abatement 
policy, lose revenue from these deals and do not reap the benefits (Bressler and Top, 2009). 
The NEA report found that at least a third of states did not reimburse schools for lost 
revenue from property tax abatements.  
The NEA report also contains a detailed description of the Texas school property 
tax abatement program. At the time of the report’s publication, the Chapter 313 program 
was new. The report reviews key features of Texas’ program, highlighting the autonomy 
that school districts have under the Chapter 313 program to approve abatements. It also 
reviews changes to Texas’ abatement reimbursement policies over time. The report, while 
concluding that states should prohibit the abatement of school property tax revenues 
altogether, recommends at least improving disclosure standards and giving school boards 
authority to approve abatements. 
In the literature, Dalehite’s 2005 evaluation of the Indiana program is one of the 
few studies that treats school property tax abatements separately from municipal or county 
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abatements and discusses the program’s implications for equity in the Indiana school 
finance system. This report offers a partial replication of Dalehite’s 2005 evaluation of the 
Indiana school property tax abatement program. Dalehite conducts an econometric 
regression analysis on the Indiana program from 1984-2000. Indiana has a redistributive 
school finance system that attempts to equalize property wealth across districts through 
school funding formulas. Dalehite’s research asks whether property-rich schools are more 
likely to participate in the abatement program, and whether the program is effective in 
expanding participating districts’ industrial property tax base.  
Dalehite finds that granting an abatement has a positive effect on the industrial 
property base. His analysis also shows that property-rich schools are more likely to 
participate in the program. From these findings, he concludes that the effects of Indiana’s 
economic development policy run counter to the objectives of the school finance system. I 
discuss Dalehite’s methodologies at further length in Chapter 4 of this report. 
Indiana’s abatement program exacerbates, rather than ameliorates, disparities in 
property wealth between districts. Policymakers and advocates regularly debate the effects 
of Texas’ school property tax abatement program on the public school finance system and 
whether the program is effective at inducing industrial firm siting. Chapter 3 discusses 
policy debates on the Texas abatement program. Given similarities between the Texas and 
Indiana school finance system and abatement programs, I undertake a replication of 
Dalehite’s study in Texas. This report seeks to add to the body of literature on tax 
abatements, broadly, as well as school property tax abatements specifically. 
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Chapter 3: The Texas Tax Abatement Program 
This chapter discusses the origins and characteristics of the Texas school property 
tax abatement program, as well as its intersection with the state’s public school finance 
system. It presents descriptive data on the program in order to provide a foundational 
context for the chapters that ensue. Understanding the objectives and trajectory of the 
program will help frame the research questions explored in the remainder of this report and 
offer important context for the discussion in the final chapter.  
Tax abatements are under debate not only in academic and national circles, but in 
the state of Texas. An often heated discussion regarding the efficacy of the school property 
tax abatement program is ongoing in Texas. The program has repeatedly received critical 
media coverage, and its iterative renewal in successive legislative sessions has not been 
without controversy or protest from lawmakers and advocates. This chapter presents an 
overview of the historical and political context of the program, which informs the research 
agenda in this report. 
ORIGINS  
As with many tax abatement programs that states adopted during the latter half of 
the 20th century, the Texas Legislature adopted its school property tax abatement program 
with the objective of attracting industrial manufacturing firms to the state. The Legislature 
adopted the program, known alternatively as either the “Texas Economic Development 
Act” or “Chapter 313” for its codification in the state’s Tax Code, in 2001. The program 
took effect in 2002 (HB 1200, 2001).  
The pressure to compete economically with other states was a strong driver of 
adoption. In March of 2001, Texas economist Ray Perryman wrote an editorial for the 
Amarillo Globe-News warning that Texas lagged behind other states in attracting 
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manufacturing firms (Perryman, 2001). Perryman expressed concern that Texas’ property 
tax-heavy revenue system placed a high tax burden on capital-intensive manufacturing 
industries. Moreover, he explained, during the mid-1990s, other states began to offer 
abatement programs and economic incentives that further exacerbated the relative cost of 
locating in Texas. Citing additional structural economic factors, such as the increasing 
mobility of labor and capital, Perryman called Texas’ 2001 position “untenable” and 
endorsed the Texas Economic Development Act. 
While the pressure to create a low-tax climate for industrial firms is not unique to 
Texas, it has arguably been intensified by the state’s lack of an income tax (Copelin, 2012). 
Lacking the third pillar of most contemporary state revenue systems (i.e. property, sales, 
and income tax), the burden of financing local municipal services, as well as public 
education, falls heavily on property-owners and capital-intensive businesses. The corporate 
tax burden in Texas, however, remains relatively low overall, due to the lack of corporate 
and individual income taxes as well as many opportunities to claim depreciation and low 
tax rates for inventory. In 2015, Texas ranked 10th nationally in the Tax Foundation’s State 
Business Climate Index, which is based on a number of taxes including corporate and 
personal income, sales, unemployment insurance, and property taxes (Walczak, Drenkard, 
and Henchman, 2015). 
Texas originally authorized cities and counties to offer property tax abatements in 
1981 with the Property Redevelopment and Tax Abatement Act, now codified in Chapter 
312 of the Texas Tax Code (SB 17, 1981). The original statute permitted cities and counties 
to abate the school district’s portion of property tax levies. In 1987, the Legislature 
amended Chapter 312 to grant school districts the authority to approve or reject proposed 
abatement agreements that would affect district revenues (Property Redevelopment and 
Tax Abatement Act, 1987).  
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Originally, the state exempted the value of abated property from districts’ total 
property tax base for the purposes of calculating state school aid, thereby ensuring that 
districts would continue to receive the same amount of funding from the state even if firms 
made property investments in the district as part of an abatement agreement. While the 
state school finance system is complex and multi-tiered, Texas allocates a portion of its 
funding to school districts through an aid formula based on district need and the size of its 
property tax base.2 The state covers a larger percentage of per pupil costs for districts with 
lower revenue capacity. As a district’s property tax base increases, it can expect to pay a 
larger share of its own costs through its local property tax revenue (Texas Taxpayers and 
Research Association, 2012). Prior to 1993, the state exempted the value of abated property 
from districts’ property tax valuation for state school aid purposes, thereby ensuring that 
the district would not suffer any loss in state aid from a local decision to grant a tax break 
to a firm. 
 In 1993, the Legislature made important changes to the Texas Education Code (SB 
7, 1993). At this point, the state chose to incorporate the value of abated property into the 
district’s property tax base for the purposes of calculating the amount of state aid that the 
district would receive. In other words, if a school district entered into an abatement 
agreement committing to exempt $1 billion in qualified property from taxation in the next 
year, that $1 billion increase in property value (though untaxed) would still be included in 
the state calculation of the district’s property tax base, thus resulting in reduced state aid to 
that district. Prior to 1993, the state had indirectly subsidized districts’ participation in the 
abatement program through the state aid system, and this policy change forced local school 
                                                 
2 The Texas school finance system is multi-layered. This report focuses on the portion of funding allocated 
through the Foundation School Program, which is designed to equalize resources across districts based on 
need and revenue capacity. Additional funding is allocated through the “target revenue system,” instituted 
in 2006. For more information, see Texas Taxpayers and Research Association, 2012. 
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districts to internalize the cost of granting those abatements (Texas Education Code, 
Sec. 36.008, 1993).  
According to the National Education Association and Good Jobs First, this change 
resulted in a dramatic decline in the number of school districts participating in new 
abatements, from 55% to 8% statewide (National Education Association, 2003). One 1996 
news article reports tension between Texas cities – whose sales taxes were buoyed by 
increased consumption and economic activity resulting from firm attraction – and school 
districts, for whom abatement participation became costly following the 1993 policy 
change (Robbins, 1996). District officials, the Lubbock-based paper reports, felt pressure 
from city officials to approve abatements that would impose large losses in both revenue 
and state aid on their districts. Some school district administrators called for a ban on 
school property tax abatements altogether during this time period, largely due to the fiscal 
costs associated with participation. 
In 2001, however, under pressure to enhance Texas’ competitiveness, the 
Legislature adopted the Texas Economic Development Act (HB 1200, 2001), which gave 
schools full autonomy to grant abatements under a new, separate program (Chapter 313). 
Moreover, the legislation reinstated the indirect subsidy to participating districts by once 
again exempting the value of abated property from districts’ property tax base (HB 1200, 
2001). The value of property that is abated under any Chapter 313 agreement is subtracted 
from the district’s total taxable value in the Comptroller’s annual Property Value Study, 
which is used as the basis for state aid calculations (Texas Government Code Sec. 403.302). 
Therefore, the value of abated property is invisible in the state aid formula, and districts 
are not at risk of having their state aid reduced when firms locate in their district under a 
Chapter 313 agreement. Although this paper does not evaluate Tax Increment Financing in 
Texas, it is notable that property located within Tax Increment Financing Zones is also 
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exempted from districts’ property tax base for the purposes of state school aid calculations 
(Texas Government Code Sec. 403.302). 
In 2001, Texas barred school districts from participating in abatement deals under 
the existing Chapter 312 program, thereby creating a separation between the school district 
abatement program and the program for cities and counties. Today, Chapter 312 governs 
the abatement program for cities and counties while Chapter 313 governs the school 
property tax abatement program. The narrative introduction to HB 1200, Chapter 313’s 
authorizing bill, confirms the act’s emphasis on interstate competition and the 
manufacturing sector, finding that: 
 
(1)  many states have enacted aggressive economic development laws 
designed to attract large employers, create jobs, and strengthen their 
economies; 
(2)  the State of Texas has slipped in its national ranking each year 
between 1993 and 2000 in terms of attracting major new manufacturing 
facilities to this state; 
(3)  a significant portion of the Texas economy continues to be based in 
the manufacturing industry, and the continued growth and overall health 
of the manufacturing sector serves the Texas economy well; 
(4)  without a vibrant, strong manufacturing sector, other sectors of the 
economy, especially the state's service sector, will also suffer adverse 
consequences; and 
(5)  the current property tax system of this state does not favor 
capital-intensive businesses such as manufacturers. 
The Legislature originally authorized the program to operate for five years, through 
the end of 2007. However, the Legislature reauthorized it successively in 2007, 2009, and 
2013, and approved expansions to the program during the most recent 2015 legislative 
session.  
  32 
PROGRAM DESIGN 
Chapter 313 gives school districts the authority to limit the appraised value of a 
firm’s property in exchange for a minimum property investment and commitment to job 
creation (Texas Tax Code, Chapter 313, 2016). The program’s stated objective is to 
incentivize industrial firm siting. As such, limitations on appraised value (i.e. abatements) 
are available only to specific industries. The law also creates a wage threshold for jobs that 
is pegged to wages in the local manufacturing sector. The minimum firm investment 
required to receive an abatement varies based on the total taxable value of the school 
district in question.  
Texas’ Chapter 313 program has a number of laudable features, and several that are 
unique to Texas. Among school tax abatement programs, specifically, Texas has 
historically been one of only two states that grants full local authority to the school district 
for abatement approval, as opposed to allowing cities or counties to make those decisions 
without input from the district (National Education Association, 2003). As of 2009, Texas 
districts share this authority with the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, but cities and 
counties do not have authority to abate school district revenues. As discussed in the 
literature review, in many states the school board lacks authority to approve or reject 
abatement agreements. In these states, abatement programs can cause fiscal stress for 
districts when cities abate district revenues without sharing accompanying fiscal benefits, 
such as payments-in-lieu of taxes (Bressler and Topp, 2009).  
Dalehite, Zorn, and Mikesell (2005) propose a framework for cataloguing variation 
in abatement programs from state-to-state (whether at the city, county or school district 
level). Table 1 draws heavily from their framework to provide an updated and expanded 
catalogue of program features for Texas’ Chapter 313 program, as of 2016. 
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Feature Texas Chapter 313 
Abatement Model 
Limitation on appraised value of qualified property 
Applies to Maintenance & Operations tax burden 
Firms pay taxes on the full market value of non-abated property 
Abatement Value 
Minimum value limitations (district can offer more): 
- Standard: $20-$10 million, based on district’s taxable property value 
- Special Investment or rural area: $10–$30 million, based on industrial value 
Special Conditions 
for Award 
Job creation 
- 25 new qualifying jobs (10 for Strategic Investment or rural area) 
- Qualifying jobs have health benefits and wages set to 110% of county 
manufacturing wage 
- Can waive job requirement if district says exceeds industry standard 
Minimum qualified property investment (districts can require more): 
- Standard: $20-$100 million, based on district taxable property value 
- Strategic or rural area: $1 - $30 million based on taxable industrial value 
Required to remain in district for 5 years following expiration of the limitation 
Reimbursement or 
Subsidy 
Yes. The value of abated property is subtracted from the district’s property tax 
base in the annual Property Value Study, which the Comptroller uses to 
determine the amount of state aid that the district will receive. Districts 
experience no reduction in state aid from ensuing property investment under 
Chapter 313 agreement, amounting to an indirect subsidy. 
Supplemental 
Payments 
Permitted only when do not exceed greater of: 
- $100 per student per year 
- $50,000 per year 
- And cannot extend beyond three years of limitation expiration 
Eligible Projects 
Semiconductor, nuclear power, integrated gasification combined cycle 
electrical, advanced clean energy, computer services, R&D, manufacturing, and 
Texas priority projects of over $1 billion 
Process for 
Granting Award 
Local discretionary plus state approval 
Texas Comptroller issues “certificate for a limitation of appraised value” based 
on: 
- Nonbinding economic impact evaluation 
- Projection that additional revenue will offset full abatement cost over 25 
years 
- Limitation being determining factor in the firm’s decision to invest 
Texas Education Agency issues statement to district on fiscal impact 
Special Target Area 
Texas Reinvestment or Enterprise Zone (Chapter 311) 
Strategic Investment and rural areas: have lower special conditions requirements 
and minimum appraisal limitation values. 
Strategic Investment Areas: have high unemployment rates or are designated 
federal urban enterprise communities or defense economic readjustment zones. 
Abated property Real and personal 
Time Period Ten years, excluding 2-year initial qualifying period wherein firm pays taxes 
Accountability 
Provisions 
Clawback if special conditions not met 
Sunset: Expiration date defined in statute, currently expires in 2022 
Audit: The state auditor performs an annual spot-check on three active 
abatements  
Table 1: Features of the Texas Chapter 313 School Property Tax Abatement Program 
Source: Framework derived from Dalehite, Mikesell, and Zorn (2005), updated and expanded to reflect the 
most current Chapter 313 of the Texas Tax Code 
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One positive feature of Texas’ abatement program, according to standards 
established in the literature, is its sunset provision. A sunset provision, as Dalehite, 
Mikesell, and Zorn (2005, 169) articulate, can bring accountability to a program by 
requiring the Legislature to regularly reevaluate whether it is still necessary to achieve the 
state’s economic development goals. However, while Texas’ program technically contains 
a sunset provision, the Legislature continues to reauthorize the program. Thus, the sunset 
provision may not function as intended if the program’s reauthorization is assumed. 
Moreover, the Legislature has reauthorized the program for increasing durations, most 
recently reauthorizing the program’s operation for another ten years from 2013-2022. The 
Legislature has renewed and even expanded the program each time it faces expiration, 
despite protests from both conservative and progressive lawmakers and subpar program 
evaluations from the Comptroller and Legislative Budget Board (Legislative Budget 
Board, 2011; Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2011). 
Another positive feature of the program is its requirement for a minimum property 
investment and number of jobs. These “special conditions,” as Dalehite, Mikesell, and Zorn 
categorize them, can help ensure a net benefit to the taxing jurisdiction and the state, as 
well as target the program toward larger firms that are more likely to have competitive 
location alternatives. However, as is becoming increasingly apparent in Texas, the jobs 
creation component of the program is lagging behind the property investment component. 
The Legislative Budget Board reported that between 2007 and 2011, sixty-three percent of 
projects were accompanied by a waiver of the jobs requirement (Legislative Budget Board, 
2011). Therefore, while Texas technically has special conditions requirements on the 
books, in practice these requirements are not binding. 
Texas has a discretionary abatement approval process, as opposed to as-of-right, 
which means that jurisdictions can exercise choice as to whether they want to grant an 
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abatement – no firm is entitled to receive an abatement simply from meeting threshold 
criteria. The program focuses on manufacturing incentives, as opposed to commercial, 
which can help ensure a net benefit to the state and local taxing entities. The Texas 
Comptroller has also praised recent changes, such as the addition of reporting and 
transparency measures and increased oversight authority for the Comptroller’s office 
(Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2011).  
However, the program also has a number of features that, according to standards in 
Dalehite, Mikesell, and Zorn (2005) may undermine its efficacy. These include limited 
state oversight, allowing limitations on the appraised value of land, and a lengthy uniform 
award duration of ten years. The Comptroller has expressed concern about the invisibility 
of program expenditures in the state budget, the lack of a cap on abatement expenditures, 
the limited amount of state oversight, and the waiver of job requirements by the majority 
of projects in recent years (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2011). 
In one of its most important program features, the state protects school districts 
from loss in state aid that would otherwise result from a firm investing property in the 
district. The value of abated property is exempted from the assigned taxable property value 
that is used to calculate both state aid and revenue redistribution obligations, therefore 
shielding districts from the loss of state aid they would typically incur from a growing 
property tax base (since school aid is strongly tied to a district’s property tax base). This 
policy creates a disincentive for districts to exercise discretion when granting abatements. 
Districts are not forced to forgo state aid when firms invest property in the district, and 
wealthy districts can use Chapter 313 as a way to shelter local revenue from redistribution 
requirements (Robbins, 2009; Imazeki and Reschovsky, 2003, 28). As Morse and Farmer 
find in their study (1986), reimbursement from the state makes granting abatements 
economically advantageous for districts where it would otherwise be cost-ineffective. 
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Morse and Farmer suggest that reimbursement policies create a perverse incentive for 
districts to adopt abatements that are not economically efficient, and recommend that 
program design force local jurisdictions to internalize abatement costs (Morse and Farmer, 
1986).  
Districts are also permitted to receive payments-in-lieu-of-taxes (PILOTs) from 
firms outside of the school property tax system. These side payments can be large and in 
some cases provide serious additional funding to the district. Some districts have even 
established small foundation programs that they fund with PILOT payments from multiple 
abatement deals over time (Smith, 2011). Firms enter into PILOT agreements voluntarily, 
and these payments are negotiated independently between districts and firms as part of the 
abatement deal. Some critics of Chapter 313 have pointed to the existence of PILOTs as 
evidence that firms (and not the public) are the primary beneficiaries of the tax abatement 
program, since firms are apparently willing to pay large sums of money to districts in order 
to receive the abatement. The value of the abatement, it is argued, must exceed the amount 
that the firm would be willing to accept, since firms would presumably not otherwise pay 
districts on the side to receive the tax breaks. This suggests that firms would still choose to 
participate in the abatement program for a much smaller tax benefit and that the state is 
paying too much to attract these firms. PILOT payments can strongly incentivize districts 
to participate in the abatement bargaining process, since PILOTS exist outside the property 
tax system and are not subject to school aid or redistribution requirements. 
The state’s policy on exempting abated property from school aid calculations, 
combined with PILOT allowances, provides a strong incentive for districts to participate 
in the abatement program. Districts bear little to no financial burden when adopting an 
agreement, as the state makes them whole with regard to state school aid. Moreover, 
districts can negotiate additional PILOTs from the firms that are not subject to 
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redistribution. Chapter 313 also allows districts to include a financial support clause in their 
abatement agreements obligating the firm to pay additional funds to the district should the 
district incur unforeseen costs not reimbursed through state aid, such as for portable 
classrooms or additional personnel. Firms enter into these additional obligations 
voluntarily as part of the abatement negotiation process with individual districts. Read on 
for more detailed information about the program’s intersection with school finance. 
Since the program’s adoption in 2001, the Legislature has enacted numerous 
changes to its design. See Table 2 for a timeline of program changes. Several pivotal 
changes have affected the program’s operation. In 2005, the Legislature introduced the first 
non-manufacturing industries to the list of eligible projects. These additions paved the way 
for the influx of wind power and clean energy firms in later years. Second, in 2007, the 
Legislature allowed districts to waive jobs requirements for firms. This also allowed for 
the influx of property-intensive, but low-employment, wind farms, which now dominate 
the abatement pool. 
In 2009, the Legislature made significant changes to the program. It gave greater 
oversight powers to the Comptroller’s office, limiting state aid reimbursement only to 
projects that the Comptroller granted approval for. It also increased transparency 
requirements and placed limitations on PILOTs. In 2013, the Legislature made the 
Comptroller’s disapproval binding and loosened wage requirements for firms. According 
to Chapter 313 in the Texas Tax Code, when approving an abatement agreement, the 
Comptroller must determine that: 
1. The firm and proposed abatement agreement meet basic eligibility requirements 
pertaining to industry, qualified property investment, and other requirements. 
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2. The agreement will be “reasonably likely” to generate sufficient additional tax 
revenue by the 25th anniversary of the agreement to off-set the loss of revenue 
to the district as a result of the abatement. 
3. The limitation on appraised value is the determining factor in whether the firm 
will locate in Texas. 
Texas lawmakers have criticized the program’s design in recent years. Former 
Republican State Senator Steven Ogden, for example, unsuccessfully attempted to limit 
state reimbursement to abating schools while he was Chair of the Senate Finance 
Committee (Copelin, 2012). He also sought to give the Comptroller more discretion about 
which agreements to approve (Copelin, 2012). Conservative groups such as the Texas 
Conservative Coalition and Research Institute (2013) have expressed concern that the 
program’s design impedes its original job creation objectives. A large percentage of tax 
benefits now goes to the wind farm sector, which creates fewer jobs than the manufacturing 
sector. 
Some critics, such as Dick Lavine of the progressive Center for Public Policy 
Priorities, express concern that many firms would have located in Texas regardless of 
whether they received a tax benefit. The state, Lavine worries, is paying firms that would 
have come to Texas without the incentive. He highlights, for example, a gas plant in the 
Kenedy school district whose stated function was to produce gas in the Eagle Ford Shale. 
The very function of the business, Lavine pointed out, is region-specific, suggesting that 
the firm probably did not require a state incentive to locate in the region (Hart, 2013). 
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YEAR BILL PROGRAM CHANGE 
2001 HB 1200 Establishes Chapter 313, authorizes program through 2007 
2002 - Chapter 313 takes effect 
2003 - First Chapter 313 agreements take effect 
2005 HB 2201 Expands list of eligible industries to include clean coal and gasification projects 
2006 HB 3 Reauthorizes program through 2011 
Places oversight authority with Texas Education Agency (TEA) 
Directs TEA to conduct binding economic impact analysis for abatement applications 
Adds wage requirements for rural areas 
2007 HB 1470 Reauthorizes program through 2011 
Grants districts option to waive job requirements 
Returns primary administrative oversight from TEA to the Comptroller 
Requires the Comptroller conduct a nonbinding economic impact analysis 
2007 HB 2294 Expands eligible industries to include nuclear power and integrated gasification 
 HB 3732 Replaces clean coal and gasification language with “ultra-clean energy projects” 
2009 HB 3676 Reauthorizes program through 2014 
Enacts lower wage requirement for firms with > 1,000 employees  
Requires district to hold public hearing to approve agreements if Comptroller issues 
disapproval 
Includes abated property in assigned taxable value for state aid, if the Comptroller 
issues disapproval 
Requires additional reporting and transparency for firms and the Comptroller 
Permits additional payments to offset increased costs to the district 
Limits PILOTs from firms to districts to $100 per student annually 
Adds clawback provision 
2013 HB 3390 Reauthorizes program through 2022 
Requires districts and firm obtain “certificate of limitation” from Comptroller  
Makes disapproval from Comptroller binding (removes public hearing requirement) 
Requires the 25 required jobs to meet “qualifying job” standards 
Requires the 10 required jobs, for rural areas, to meet “qualifying job” standards 
Removes requirement that “80% of all new jobs” meet qualifying job standards 
Removes wage level exemption for firms >1,000 employees 
Expands the list of eligible projects to include “Texas Priority Projects” 
Requires state auditor to conduct annual spot check of abatement agreements  
Allows firm to double count jobs from a single project in two districts 
Changes criteria that Comptroller must consider when granting certificate of 
limitation 
Extends abatement duration from 8 to 10 years 
Adds financial penalty for failure to meet job requirements 
Adds reporting and transparency requirements for Comptroller and firms 
Adds Strategic Investment Area 
Raises minimum limitation amounts for rural and strategic area investments 
Raises PILOT cap to the greater of either $100 per student or $50,000 annually 
Repeals tax credits to firms for taxes paid during qualifying period 
2015 HB 2826 Expands Chapter 313 to include unified projects that overlap with up to three districts 
Table 2: Timeline of Chapter 313 Program Reforms 
Source: Author’s bill and statute analysis, news media coverage; as well as Lavine (2007, 2013, 2015), 
Casey and O’Hanlon (2008), and Casey, Popinksi, and O’Hanlon (2009). 
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Recent reports from the Comptroller, Legislative Budget Board, and State 
Auditor’s Office offer the following critiques of the program: 
1) No requirement exists for schools or the Comptroller to verify jobs created 
independently (Texas State Auditor’s Office, 2014 and 2015) 
2) There is no cap on expenditures; state tax expenditures through the program are 
potentially limitless and unaccounted for in the budget (Legislative Budget 
Board, 2011; Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2011) 
3) The economic impact evaluation that the Comptroller performs is only a 
presentation of information, and not a true evaluation of the impact of the 
project on the state or local economy (Legislative Budget Board, 2011) 
4) The cost is borne entirely by state, but the state has little oversight. Districts 
have little disincentive to reject abatement agreements (Legislative Budget 
Board, 2011; Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2011) 
5) Companies have a disincentive to create jobs above a statutory minimum and 
many jobs requirements are waived (Legislative Budget Board, 2011) 
6) Wind energy does not create as many jobs, but increasingly constitutes a large 
portion of abated property value (Legislative Budget Board, 2011; Texas 
Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2011) 
 
In an evaluation of the program in its 2011 Government Effectiveness and 
Efficiency Report (GEER), the Legislative Budget Board highlights the complexity of 
assigning economic development authority to overlapping governmental jurisdictions and 
questions whether economic development should rest under the purview of schools: 
…school districts should not be made responsible for economic 
development. School districts have the primary responsibility for 
implementing the state’s system of public education and ensuring 
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student performance…A lack of balance in the roles, 
responsibilities, and authority of the state and of local school 
districts within the program limits its effectiveness.”  
POLITICAL CLIMATE 
Preserving and enhancing Texas’ economic competitiveness remains a core driver 
of program support. As recently as January, 2016, the Bay Area Houston Magazine opined 
in an editorial: “Without 313 agreements, our region would be less enticing to big 
businesses and we could lose important projects to Louisiana and other states.” The article 
brags that La Porte ISD (LPISD), located in Harris County, currently hosts eight Chapter 
313 agreements, which purportedly enhance its economic competitiveness.  
Whereas, during the nineties, the state’s school aid reimbursement policy made the 
tax abatement program unpopular among many school districts, today the program 
maintains a high degree of popularity among district administrators. Consulting groups and 
lobbying groups represent districts’ interests at the Legislature and seek to preserve the 
program for the benefit of participating districts (Casey and O’Hanlon, 2008; Casey, 
Popinkski, and O’Hanlon, 2009). Some district administrators see the program as an 
opportunity to attract businesses that will grow their district’s tax base in the long-term, 
thereby enhancing the district’s fiscal health. District administrators feel they can grow 
their tax base in the long term without sacrificing state school aid in the short-term (since 
the value of abated property is exempted from the property tax base for school aid 
calculations). The Bay Area Houston Magazine article quotes La Porte ISD’s 
superintendent: “These industries probably would not have located in La Porte had it not 
been for the ability of our school district to enter into Chapter 313 agreements with them.”  
Districts also enjoy supplemental PILOT payments from firms outside of the school 
property tax system. Neither PILOT payments nor the value of abated property is included 
when determining whether and how much a district owes in redistributive school finance 
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funds. Property-wealthy “Chapter 41” schools typically owe some amount of excess 
revenue to the state, but by granting tax abatements they can reduce their assigned property 
tax base and, by implication, the amount they owe in recaptured revenue to the state. 
Districts can then make up some of the reduced tax revenue from the abatement with 
supplemental PILOT payments. 
While the literature shows that there are fiscal costs associated with abatements in 
the form of increased service needs and employee in-migration, I was unable to locate any 
quotes from administrators expressing concern about these potential costs. Perhaps part of 
this is due to the state’s policy on state school aid. Districts receive the same amount of 
funding from the state as if they had not granted an abatement – growth in abated property 
is exempted from the base that is used to calculate a district’s state aid. If the district’s 
population grows, but its assigned property tax base remains static, then the state foots the 
bill for any resultant growth in need. 
Firms also continue to lend strong support to the program. Samsung currently 
benefits from an active abatement agreement with the Manor Independent School District 
(MISD). In 2012, leading up to the program’s 2013 reauthorization, Samsung’s 
spokesperson in Austin emphasized the importance of renewing the program. "I can't 
emphasize enough how critical 313 is to us," Morse said, "To get that (future) investment, 
we have to have 313 reauthorized” (Copelin, 2012). 
The program has received controversial media coverage in prior years. The Austin-
American Statesman, the New York Times, the Texas Observer and the Houston Chronicle 
have all published pieces that highlight the program’s perverse incentives. In 2011, the 
New York Times published an article entitled “Wind Money Fuels Spending and Benefits 
in Small Schools.” The article highlights Blackwell ISD, which received a $35 million 
PILOT from a wind farm deal that the district brokered in 2005 as part of the 313 program. 
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This money has paid for a football stadium, an academic complex, and a scholarship 
foundation (Smith, 2011). School district administrators see the program as a source of 
funding for everything from infrastructure to early college preparation. In 2012, the San 
Antonio Express-News published an article entitled, “Texas’ tax abatement program too 
broad,” followed in 2013 by the Austin American Statesman’s, “Big Money, Little 
Oversight.” 
Stakeholders in the program are diverse and run the gamut from school district 
superintendents to oil and gas firms, manufacturing firms, and increasingly the wind energy 
sector. Every legislative session, the wind energy sector monitors developments in Chapter 
313.  In fact, some stakeholders have indicated that the wind sector has come to expect tax 
abatements from local districts. In a 2013 article for North American Windpower, two 
sector consultants opined that, prior to 2013 program changes, “Chapter 313 [was] 
considered a ‘right’ for any wind farm planning to do business in Texas,” but that more 
stringent regulations would change this expectation (Molina, 2013). 
Conservative think tanks and Republican legislators have expressed concern about 
the program and its effects on the school finance system. Republican State Senator Lois 
Kolkhorst said in 2013, regarding Chapter 313 PILOTS, "We spend a lot of time talking 
about equity in this building and then we have off-book finances that create inequity” (Hart, 
2013). Conservative advocacy groups have critiqued the program, calling it corporate 
welfare. The Texas Public Policy Foundation (TPPF) recommends the Legislature phase 
out the program entirely, along with other economic incentive programs that it says distort 
the market and amount to a corporate giveaway (TPPF, 2013). The Texas Conservative 
Coalition Research Institute (2013) says that the program should be amended to prohibit 
districts from waiving the minimum job requirement, prohibit supplemental PILOT 
payments to districts, and remove renewable energy industries from program eligibility.  
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The renewable energy industry, meanwhile, has developed a high-value and 
tangible stake in the debate. In discussing the eligibility of renewable energy and jobs 
waivers programs, the industry states: “Renewable energy needs to remain, as it currently 
reads, in Chapter 313 with local control maintained when job waivers are considered” 
(Mirzatuny, 2013). The diverse group of stakeholders with material interests in the program 
may be a barrier to program reform. The ongoing political controversy over the program 
from session to session suggests that program reform is possible but may continue to be 
difficult given the coalition of interests with material benefits at stake. 
INTERSECTION WITH THE SCHOOL FINANCE SYSTEM 
The program’s intersection with the state school finance system is strongly tied to 
the state’s school aid policy and its allowance of PILOTs. As articulated by the Legislative 
Budget Board in the 2011 GEER report, districts do not bear the cost of the program since 
the value of the abatement is excluded from the district’s property tax base for the purpose 
of state aid calculations, thus ensuring that the local district does not lose revenue from 
abatement deals. The cost of the program is borne by the “Foundation” portion of the school 
finance system which apportions the “state aid” component of district funding. Tier 1 of 
the Foundation School Program funds “basic education” expenses, such as maintenance 
and operations. Tier II provides supplemental funding. Districts receive remaining funding 
from the “Target School Program,” which was instituted in 2006 and which is outside the 
scope of this report. 
The Foundation School Program uses a state aid formula to award funding to 
schools based on: 1) need, and 2) revenue capacity. First, the state calculates the district’s 
per pupil funding need, using a cost of education index and some other factors. The state 
then compute’s the district’s total funding allotment based on number of students in 
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different categories, such as special education needs, bilingual students, and other student 
types that might affect funding need. The state and district split cost of the total allotment. 
The local share is determined by multiplying the district’s Maintenance and Operations tax 
rate by the taxable property value that it has been assigned by the Comptroller. A district’s 
assigned property tax base thus bears significant influence on its share of the educational 
cost. If a district’s need goes up, but its property tax base stays the same, it can expect to 
receive more funding from the state to make up the difference. If a state’s need stays the 
same, but its property tax base increases, then it will pay a larger share of its own per pupil 
costs with local revenues. The Texas school finance system is multi-tiered and complex, 
and a more detailed discussion is outside the scope of this report. For a step-by-step review 
of how the system works, please see the Texas Taxpayers and Research Association 
publication from 2012. 
Each year, the Comptroller’s office conducts a Property Value Study that is used as 
the foundation for Tier I state school aid funding. Approved Chapter 313 abatements are 
exempted from districts’ assigned taxable value, and therefore state aid to the district 
remains the same, despite an increase in industrial property investment over the span of the 
abatement agreement. To clarify, the program does not directly provide additional funding 
to districts that participate in abatements, but instead subsidizes the program by 
maintaining the district’s level of aid despite the influx of additional property investment 
(Texas Taxpayers and Research Association, 2012).  
Moreover, if the school’s level of need increases (according to the standardized 
calculations in the Foundation School Program formulas), but its assigned property tax 
value and tax rate remains the same, the state makes up the difference. According to these 
principles, the state also subsidizes any additional costs that the district might incur from 
population growth, since the district’s need grows but its revenue capacity remains static – 
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with the state making up the difference. In 2011, the Legislative Budget Board found that 
the program was revenue-neutral to local schools since the state subsidized the full cost of 
the program through its state aid policies. 
Lastly, Texas’ school finance system has important “wealth equalization” 
components that it adopted in response to a number of court rulings that declared the school 
finance system unconstitutional. In an effort to mitigate unconstitutional disparities in 
public education funding, caused by varying degrees of property wealth across districts, 
the state enacted a wealth equalization provision in 1993. This provision exists apart from 
the state aid calculations required by the Foundation School Program and requires districts 
whose taxable value per pupil exceeds a statutory threshold to return a portion of that 
revenue to the state to fund education in property-poor districts (SB 7, 1993). 
Today, the wealth equalization regulations are contained in Chapter 41 of the Texas 
Education Code, giving the “Robin Hood” donor schools their name as “Chapter 41” 
districts. As part of this program, property-wealthy districts whose taxable property value 
per student exceeds a certain threshold ($504,000 per pupil in 2015), must give excess 
revenues back to the state to fund poor schools. This process, whereby the state 
reapportions revenue over the statutory threshold to property-poor schools, is called  
recapture” (Texas Education Agency, Office of School Finance, 2014). Districts can meet 
their Chapter 41 requirements in a number of ways, but most choose to either purchase 
“attendance credits” directly from the state or contract with a less-wealthy neighboring 
jurisdiction directly to educate a sufficient number of students to offset their excess 
revenues. 
The intersection between Chapter 41 and the abatement program is complex. 
According to statute, TEA must “determine the wealth per student of a school district under 
[Chapter 41] as if any tax abatement agreement executed by a school district on or after 
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May 31, 1993, had not been executed” (Texas Education Code Chapter 41.009). When 
evaluating TEA’s district state aid reports, it becomes clear that (as with state aid in the 
Foundation School Program) the value of abated property is exempted from the property 
tax base used to determine Chapter 41 status. That is, the formula that is used to determine 
Chapter 41 status, and the amount of local revenue subject to recapture, excludes the value 
of property that has been abated under a Chapter 313 agreement. As with the state aid 
formula policy, this means that the property value used to determines a school’s donor 
status in the school finance system is artificially low. A district may be able to alter its 
Chapter 41 status and its state recapture obligations by offering abatements. In this way, 
wealthy districts can shelter their revenue from state redistribution requirements. 
Thus, districts that might be obligated to cede a portion of their revenue to the state 
seek mechanisms to shelter their local revenue from recapture. Chapter 313 can act as one 
of these mechanisms. First, it offers a way for jurisdictions to reduce the amount of revenue 
they might owe back to the state. Second, districts can accept PILOTs from firms that exist 
outside of the property tax system entirely. Districts can reduce the amount they owe in 
recapture, while making up the lost revenue through firm side payments. Wealthy districts 
often perceive PILOTs as the only way to protect their revenues from recapture by the state 
school finance system. As the Bay Area Houston Magazine pointed out as recently as 
January, 2016, Chapter 313 agreements allow a district to hold on to funds that they would 
have otherwise lost by receiving payments-in-lieu-of-taxes from the firms. In short, the 
magazine reports, “Chapter 313 agreements can keep a greater percentage of funds in the 
local ISD” (Bay Area Houston Magazine, 2016). 
A recent Houston Chronicle article reports on the Barbers Hill school district, 
which has been a Chapter 41 school for the last 17 years (Texas Education Agency, Chapter 
41 data, 2016). The article features the district superintendent speaking proudly about the 
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district’s $2 million private foundation, built from PILOT payments, that awards 
scholarships for teachers. Similarly, for the past 21 years, the Texas Education Agency has 
classified La Porte ISD as a property-wealthy school, and the district returns a portion of 
its tax revenue back to the state to fund property-poor schools. In 2014, LPISD reduced its 
assigned taxable property value by $92 million via Chapter 313 abatement agreements 
(Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, Property Value Study, 2014. In 2015, the state 
recaptured over $20 million from LPISD, while LPISD continues to collect PILOTs from 
its abatement agreements. According to the most recent report on Chapter 313 from the 
Comptroller, LPISD has agreements for PILOTs totaling over $34 million (from the eight 
abatement agreements that it entered into between 2010 and 2014). PILOTs are voluntary 
agreements between districts and firms, but act as a powerful incentive for districts to 
participate in the agreement since they can confer large tangible benefits to districts that 
perceive themselves as losing local revenue to the state school finance system. 
This paper, in part, attempts to elucidate whether property wealth and Chapter 41 
status have any bearing upon a district’s likelihood of participating in the abatement 
program. The program has not undergone any comprehensive evaluation to date and as 
such this paper will contribute to the body of literature available to inform policymakers 
on this issue. 
CURRENT PROGRAM DATA 
In 2014, fifty-three percent of the 259 active Chapter 313 projects were for 
renewable energy (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2014). Only 21% of the 
qualified property investment in districts, however, was for renewable energy. Seventy-six 
percent of the property investments came from the manufacturing sector. The renewable 
energy sector, therefore, is receiving a large percentage of the benefits while contributing 
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a minority percentage of property investment. This suggests that the program has strayed 
from its original function as an industrial and manufacturing incentive program. The 
current level of property investment by participating firms is estimated to be $123 billion 
(for all agreements and for their full lifespan of 8 to 10 years each). In 2014, the 
Comptroller estimated that the state paid $5.5 billion in gross tax benefits to firms, 72% of 
which went to renewable energy firms (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2014). This 
amounted to approximately $91,000 per job created in the program. It is notable that, 
because wind energy farms often lease their land from corporate or individual agricultural 
owners, the abatement program can act as an indirect subsidy to the agricultural sector, 
which receives rental payments from the wind farm corporations (US Government 
Accountability Office, 2004). Farmers and agricultural owners can often continue 
agricultural operations concurrently with leasing some portion of their land to wind farm 
companies. 
As of fall 2015, according to Chapter 313 program data from the Texas 
Comptroller, 157 school districts maintained one or more active Chapter 313 abatement 
agreements. Barbers Hill ISD had the most, with 14 active abatement agreements on the 
books. Brazosport ISD had eight, and La Porte ISD had 7 (Texas Comptroller of Public 
Accounts, Chapter 313 data, 2015). In 2014, twenty-five percent of districts with an active 
abatement agreement were Chapter 41 schools, compared to only 22% of districts statewide 
(Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, Chapter 313 data, 2014; Texas Education Agency, 
district Chapter 41 data, 2014). Eight percent were located in a major urban or suburban 
district, compared to only 4% statewide. The taxable value per pupil in Chapter 313 
districts was $1.1 billion compared to only $681,000 statewide (Texas Comptroller of 
Public Accounts, Chapter 313 data and Property Value Study, 2014).  
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The Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts reported that, as of 2014, firms had paid 
or committed to paying over $826 million in supplemental payments (referred to as PILTS 
in the Comptroller’s documents) to firms over the lifetime of all active agreements. The 
Comptroller reported that renewable energy firms returned 20% of the value of their tax 
break to districts through supplemental payments, whereas manufacturing projects returned 
only 13% through supplemental payments (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 2014). 
The following chapter provide a quantitative program evaluation of Chapter 313, 
exploring whether property wealth and Chapter 41 status influence program participation 
and whether granting abatements is associated with growth in the industrial property tax 
base.  
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
This study employs a mixed methods approach to explore the efficacy of, and 
causal factors influencing selection into, Texas’ school property tax abatement program. 
The study includes an econometric analysis of variables influencing districts’ selection into 
the program and the effect of abatement participation on districts’ industrial property tax 
base. 
To contextualize the quantitative findings, this report also presents limited results 
from a qualitative survey of superintendents and school board presidents in districts that 
currently host a Chapter 313 abatement agreement. The objective of the survey is to obtain 
perspectives on Texas’ tax abatement program from district officials who have had 
experience approving or administering the program. The following sections discuss the 
report’s methodology and highlight limitations in the research design. 
REGRESSION METHODOLOGY 
I model the regression and identification strategy on Dalehite’s 2005 evaluation of 
the Indiana school property tax abatement program. Dalehite’s study examines the 
program’s effects on districts’ property tax base and its implications for Indiana’s public 
school finance system. Dalehite employs a two-step econometric technique whereby he 
estimates the probability of a district’s selection into the abatement program using probit 
regression, calculates a self-selection adjustment term for each district based on its 
estimated probability of adopting an abatement (i.e. the Heckman correction), and finally 
incorporates this selection term into an OLS regression outcome model to ascertain the 
effect of abatement participation on districts’ property tax base.  
This paper replicates components of Dalehite’s approach, making adjustments to 
the technique and variables based on my own judgment and data availability. I employ a 
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two-step approach but elect to use a propensity score matching model rather than the 
Heckman correction used by Dalehite. I make this choice based on the understanding that 
the Heckman correction is primarily employed in situations where outcomes for the 
“control” population are unobserved (Bushway, Johnson, and Slocum, 2007). The 
traditional example is when the researcher is evaluating a workforce participation program 
wherein she only has access to wage data for program participants, and not for 
nonparticipants in the general population. 
However, I do have access to outcome data for the “control” population in this 
study (i.e. property value assessments for school districts that have not adopted a tax 
abatement). Therefore, I elect to use a propensity score matching model to control for 
effects of program self-selection. The matching model has some weaknesses, primarily 
resulting from a reduced sample size, that I discuss in this chapter. The following sections 
discuss the study population and regression model, which draw heavily upon Dalehite’s 
2005 work on Indiana. Tables and regression model design are adapted from Dalehite. 
Study Period and Population 
The population of interest is all 1,024 public school districts in the state of Texas 
in 2014. The full study sample actually consists of 999 districts. I removed fourteen 
districts from the original study population because they consolidated during the study 
period, and another 11 districts that were missing data on either property tax or population 
covariates. The Texas Legislature adopted Chapter 313 during the 2001 Legislative Session 
and the program took effect in 2002 with the first abatement agreements took effect in 
2003. The most current property tax value data were available for 2014. Therefore, this 
study evaluates Chapter 313 between 2003 and 2014. Replicating Dalehite’s approach, I 
evaluate program performance across three separate study periods: the early period (2003-
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2007), the late period (2008-2014) and the full study period (2003-2014). I anticipate that 
evaluating the program over multiple periods will allow me to better assess program 
performance over time.   
I define abatement participation as a district adopting at least one active Chapter 
313 abatement agreement during the study period in question. I use the first year of the 
initial qualifying period as the start date for the abatement. Table 3 presents data on the 
number of unique districts adopting an abatement, by year, for each study period. Please 
note that some districts adopted abatements in both the early and later study periods. These 
districts were counted in both the early and late study groups, and then counted only once 
in the grand total. Therefore, the Grand Total column does not always equal the sum of the 
early and late study periods.  Counts provided within each study period are cumulative. 
Year 
Early Period 
(2003-2007) 
 
Late Perioda 
(2008-2014) 
Grand Totalb 
(2003-2014) 
By 2002 0 - 0 
2003 3 - 3 
2004 6 - 6 
2005 10 - 10 
2006 15 - 15 
2007 25* - 25 
2008 - 23 41 
2009 - 39 55 
2010 - 45 61 
2011 - 50 64 
2012 - 60 73 
2013 - 76 87 
2014 - 115 128 
Table 3: Number of Unique Districts Hosting Abatements by Year and Study Period 
a The districts of Goldthwaite, Olney, and Webb adopted abatements during the late period from 2008-2014. 
However, they also consolidated between 2002 and 2014. I therefore excluded them from this analysis. 
b Some districts adopted abatements during both the early and late periods. I count these districts in each 
respective period, and once in the full study period. Due to this redundancy across study periods, the early 
and late adoption groups do not sum to the abatement total. 
Note: Adapted from Dalehite (2005) for Texas and this replication study. 
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For more information on data sources and definitions see the Appendix. 
Modeling Approach 
The regression model evaluates: 1) variables influencing districts’ selection into 
Chapter 313 (i.e. the treatment) during each of the three study periods; and 2) after 
controlling for program self-selection, the effects of abatement participation on the 
industrial property tax base (i.e. outcome) during each study period. For each study period, 
districts take on a dummy variable value of 1 if they have adopted at least one Chapter 313 
abatement during that time period or 0 if they have not. The study employs a quasi-
experimental propensity-score matching design to better understand the effects of 
abatements on districts’ industrial property tax base. Table 4 presents a simplified version 
of the counterfactual that this study explores. 
 
Outcome Time 1 Treatment Outcome Time 2 
Industrial Property Tax Base (Time 1) Tax Abatement Industrial Property Tax Base (Time 2) 
Industrial Property Tax Base (Time 1)  Industrial Property Tax Base (Time 2) 
Table 4: Treatment Counterfactual 
Propensity score matching is a two-step, quasi-experimental approach that can help 
control for differences in unobserved variables that arise due to treatment self-selection. 
Districts that choose to participate in the abatement program may differ in important ways 
from districts that choose to not participate – and these differences can affect the outcome 
variable. A propensity-score matching design creates a study sample that is more 
comparable with regard to key variables. 
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As a first step in the propensity score matching process, I use a logistic regression 
model to: 1) evaluate whether certain variables influence districts’ selection into the 
abatement program, and 2) estimate the probability of Chapter 313 participation for each 
district. I then use those estimated probabilities to construct matched district pairs that are 
more comparable with regard to the selection covariates. This matching process helps 
control for observed, and hopefully some unobserved, variables that may influence 
districts’ selection into the program. The logistic selection equation is as follows: 
PPTAt = αX(t-1) + ut 
Where PPTAt represents the probability of entering into a Chapter 313 agreement 
during the study period t; X(t-1) is a vector of selection variables measured during the year 
prior to the beginning of the study period; α is the parameter for each explanatory variable, 
to be estimated; and ut is the error term for the study period. 
The logistic model generates estimated probabilities from 0 through 1 for property 
tax abatement participation. After estimating these probabilities, I sort districts by 
estimated abatement probability (separately for each study period), pairing districts from 
the top of the sorted list down and extracting only matched pairs containing both an 
abatement and non-abatement district. I remove the unmatched non-abatement districts 
from the study sample. This produces a reduced sample for each study period, equal to 
twice the size of the participating Chapter 313 population, that is better matched on the 
selection model covariates. 
Finally, I use the reduced sample, containing only the matched pairs, to evaluate 
the effects of abatement participation on districts’ industrial property tax base. I use a fixed 
effects OLS regression model, introducing additional covariates that Dalehite identifies as 
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potential contributors to changes in industrial property tax base over time. The OLS 
outcome equation is as follows: 
ΔPTVt= βΔZt + δPTAt  + Δεt 
Where PTAt is a dummy variable of either 0 or 1 representing abatement 
participation during the study period t; δ is the parameter for abatement participation, to be 
estimated; ΔZt is a vector representing the change in population and fiscal covariates over 
the course of the study period; β is the parameter defining the effects of the changes in 
covariates over the study period, to be estimated; ΔPTVt represents the change in industrial 
property value assessment over the course of the study period; and Δεt is the error term for 
the model. The following sections describe the explanatory variables that I include in each 
model. 
Selection Model Variables 
To predict Chapter 313 abatement participation, I draw heavily from the list of 
regressors that Dalehite uses in his evaluation of the Indiana abatement program. The 
following section contains a description and justification for each variable. See Table 5 for 
a concise description of all variables in the selection model and the Appendix for more 
information on data sources. 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable for the selection model is a district’s abatement 
participation. I define this as a dummy variable that takes a value of 0 if the district has 
granted no active abatements during the study period, or a value of 1 if it has granted at 
least one active abatement during that time period. I assign a value of 0 if the qualifying 
abatement agreement was cancelled by either the district or Comptroller due to 
noncompliance. I replicate the approach taken by Dalehite.  
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The dependent variable may differ across study periods: 2003-2007, 2008-2014, 
and 2003-2014. While Dalehite drops all early-adopting districts from his evaluation of the 
late study period, I elect to keep the early adopting districts in the later study sample, coded 
as a 0 if they do not adopt an additional abatement during the later period. Some districts 
choose to adopt multiple abatements over time. I do not wish to exclude districts that grant 
abatements during both time periods from evaluation in later years since these districts are 
making repeated decisions to opt into treatment, with potential implications for selection 
probability estimates. 
 
Variable Description 
earlyabate (eb) 1=adopted an active abatement agreement between 2003 and 2007; 0=all else 
latabate (lb) 1=adopted an active abatement agreement between 2008 and 2014; 0=all else 
allabate (ab) 1=adopted an active abatement agreement between 2003 and 2014; 0=all else 
tax rate district’s tax rate per $100 (M&O and I&S) (2002 for eb and ab, 2007 for lb) 
tot tax value/pup total taxable value of property per pupil (2002 for eb and ab, 2007 for lb) 
assess ind/pup total assessed industrial property value per pupil, (2002 for eb and ab, 2007 for lb) 
assess resid/pup total assessed residential property per pupil (2002 eb and ab, 2007 lb) 
urban status 1=if district classified as “Major Urban” or “Major Suburban” by TEA; 0=all else 
(2002 for eb and ab, 2007 for lb) 
% edu dis % of students receiving a free or reduced price lunch (2002 for eb and ab, 2007 for 
lb) 
Δ fed funda decline in federal funding per pupil (from 98-02 for eb and ab, 02-07 for lb) 
total chapter 312 # of Chapter 312 agreements in overlapping city or county jurisdictions (2002 for eb 
and ab, 2007 for lb) 
chapter 41 status 1=has Chapter 41 status; 0=all else (2002 for eb or ab, 2007 for lb) 
Table 5: Variable Descriptions for Logistic Selection Model 
Note: For information on data sources, see the Appendix. 
a Expressed in inflation-adjusted 2002 or 2007 dollars, respectively 
Note: Adapted from Dalehite (2005) for Texas and this replication study. 
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Independent Variables 
The following sections contain more detailed descriptions of the independent 
selection variables. Independent variables are primarily fiscal and are informed by the 
literature on abatement participation, Dalehite (2005), and the Texas context. 
Tax Rate: 
When controlling for property tax base, the tax rate is an indicator of either fiscal 
stress or health (Dalehite, 2005, 44). This variable helps to test the hypothesis that fiscal 
duress influences the probability of granting an abatement. Given contradictory findings 
from the literature on the fiscal stress and health hypotheses, I do not offer a prediction 
regarding the sign of the tax rate variable in Texas. 
Total Taxable Value per Pupil: 
As Dalehite articulates, taxable property value is the primary determinant of a 
district’s ability to fund education and also determines how much state aid the district 
receives. This is true in both Texas and Indiana. Dalehite’s study finds that the taxable 
value of personal property predicts abatement participation. Given Dalehite’s findings in 
Indiana and the incentives provided by Texas’ program design, I hypothesize that school 
districts with a greater preexisting ability to finance public education will be more likely 
to grant tax abatements. Dalehite breaks out taxable value according to real and personal 
property classification. Unfortunately, this breakout is unavailable in Texas due to a 
number of exemptions that apply to both real and personal property. 
Assessed Industrial and Residential Value per Pupil: 
To compensate for the lack of data on taxable real and personal property, I include 
assessed industrial and residential property value in the model. I anticipate that these 
variables will elucidate whether residential or industrial property drives abatement 
participation. Even though the taxable value for each of these property classes is 
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unavailable, these variables represent an improvement over Dalehite’s real versus personal 
property classification. Due to lack of data in Indiana, Dalehite uses personal property as a 
proxy for industrial property, and real property as a proxy for residential. However, Texas 
provides direct data on assessed industrial and residential property, therefore negating the 
need for a proxy variable.  
I anticipate that these variables, in conjunction with the total taxable value variable, 
will provide more specific insight into the property classes that drive abatement 
participation. Dalehite predicts and finds that personal property wealth is associated with a 
higher probability of abatement participation, while real property is associated with a lower 
probability. Given his findings, I anticipate a replication in Texas. 
Urban Status: 
Dalehite includes a population density variable in his model to control for the 
influence of urban geography on abatement participation. However, the Texas Education 
Agency (TEA) provides its own urban and rural classification criteria for districts. Given 
that estimates of school district population density are subject to margins of error (from the 
American Community Survey), I elect to use the uniform classifications provided by TEA. 
I define urban status as a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for districts that TEA 
classifies as either “major urban” or “major suburban,” since both of these categories 
reflect major population centers. The dummy variable takes a value of zero if otherwise. I 
anticipate the direction to be positive. 
Percent of Students Educationally Disadvantaged: 
Dalehite includes Indiana’s educational cost index in the model to assess whether 
districts with a higher concentration of children in poverty are more likely to offer 
abatements. Literature demonstrates that students living in poverty have a higher per pupil 
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expenditure need, and therefore the percentage of students who are educationally 
disadvantaged affects districts’ level of fiscal stress. I elect to include the percentage of 
students who are educationally disadvantaged, referring to the percent who are eligible to 
receive free and reduced price lunch, as an indicator of need.  
I use this variable, rather than Texas’ cost of education index (cei) because the 
Legislature has not updated the cei since 1990. Thus, while the cost index may affect the 
level of state aid that a district receives in Texas, it is does not necessarily reflect districts’ 
current level of need. As with the tax rate variable, the sign for this variable could be either 
positive or negative. 
Change in Federal Funding per Pupil: 
If the fiscal stress hypothesis holds, then districts experiencing reduced federal 
funding should be more likely to adopt abatements. Dalehite includes this variable in the 
selection model particularly because the 1980s constituted a time of significant devolution 
and retraction of federal funding from local schools. While this dynamic may not be as 
pronounced for the current study periods, I include this variable to control for any similar 
effects.  
Number of Overlapping Chapter 312 Agreements: 
 I include this as an original variable, in addition to the aforementioned variables 
that Dalehite evaluates. Literature suggests that jurisdictions may be more likely to offer 
abatements when neighboring jurisdictions offer abatements, and that jurisdictions offering 
abatements continue to offer more abatements over time. In other words, some literature 
posits that abatement participation creates a positive feedback loop for abating jurisdictions 
and their neighbors. Texas administers a municipal and county tax abatement program in 
addition to the school property tax abatement program. In order to account for potential 
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effects of these abatements on school district abatement participation, I include a variable 
representing the number of Chapter 312 (municipal or county) tax abatements offered in 
overlapping jurisdictions in the year immediately prior to the study period. 
Chapter 41 Status: 
 This variable is also an original addition to the model. In Texas, districts whose 
taxable value per pupil exceeds a level defined in state statute become donors to the school 
finance system. Revenues per pupil over the statutory threshold are funneled to the state to 
fund education in property-poor school districts. These donor schools are known as 
“Chapter 41” schools in reference to the associated chapter in the Texas Education Code. 
This variable will help test my hypothesis that the programmatic features of Chapter 313 
incentivize participation from schools that are required to funnel revenues to the state.  
Tables 6, 7, and 8 provide descriptive statistics on the selection model variables for 
each study period. 
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Group Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Early Abater 
(n=25) 
tax rate 02 1.56 0.13 1.32 1.79 
tot tax value/pup 02a 4.83 5.41 0.56 27.09 
assess ind/pup 02a 2.43 5.24 0.00 24.53 
assess resid/pup 02a 1.05 1.03 0.05 3.97 
urban status 02 0.48 0.51 0.00 1.00 
% edu dis 02 41.28 18.56 0.00 76.10 
Δ fed fund 98-02b -180.46 145.44 -549.23 51.83 
total chapter 312 02 1.64 2.93 0.00 13.00 
chapter 41 status 02 0.36 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Controls  
(n=974) 
tax rate 02 1.54 0.14 0.91 2.00 
tot tax value/pup 02a 2.72 3.25 0.04 40.69 
assess ind/pup 02a 0.32 0.89 0.00 12.24 
assess resid/pup 02a 0.87 1.08 0.00 13.78 
urban status 02 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00 
% edu dis 02 48.06 19.42 0.00 100.00 
Δ fed fund 98-02b -201.19 230.40 -2320.53 2493.04 
total chapter 312 02 0.50 2.38 0.00 64.00 
chapter 41 status 02 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Districts, Early Abatement Period (2003-2007) 
a Expressed in hundreds of thousands of 2002 dollars 
b Expressed in 2002 dollars 
Group Variable Mean SD Min Max 
All Abaters 
(n=128) 
tax rate 02 1.53 0.14 1.04 1.94 
tot tax value/pup 02a 4.21 5.46 0.55 40.69 
assess ind/pup 02a 1.01 2.70 0.00 24.53 
assess resid/pup 02a 0.68 0.62 0.02 3.97 
urban status 02 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
% edu dis 02 49.63 19.02 0.00 88.70 
Δ fed fund98-02b -209.46 158.88 -681.12 55.77 
total chapter 312 02 0.61 1.57 0.00 13.00 
chapter 41 status 02 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Controls 
(n=871) 
tax rate 02 1.54 0.14 0.91 2.00 
tot tax value/pup 02a 2.56 2.83 0.04 36.57 
assess ind/pup 02a 0.28 0.80 0.00 12.24 
assess resid/pup 02a 0.90 1.13 0.00 13.78 
urban status 02 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
% edu dis 02 47.64 19.47 0.00 100.00 
Δ fed fund 98-02b -199.38 237.20 -2320.53 2493.04 
total chapter 312 02 0.52 2.49 0.00 64.00 
chapter 41 status 02 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for Districts, Full Study Period (2003-2014) 
a Expressed in hundreds of thousands of 2002 dollars 
b Expressed in 2002 dollars 
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Group Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Late Abaters 
(n=115) 
tax rate 07 1.17 0.13 0.88 1.53 
tot tax value/pup 07a 8.24 13.63 0.80 85.71 
assess ind/pup 07a 1.27 2.43 0.00 19.78 
assess resid/pup 07a 0.84 0.65 0.02 4.46 
urban status 07 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
% edu dis 07 54.58 17.17 19.50 93.80 
Δ fed fund 02-07b 969.65 699.30 0.00 3762.87 
total chapter 312 07 0.80 1.81 0.00 9.00 
chapter 41 status 07 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Controls 
(n=884) 
tax rate 07 1.19 0.14 0.73 1.67 
tot tax value/pup 07a 4.10 5.40 0.03 64.13 
assess ind/pup 07a 0.44 1.24 0.00 18.27 
assess resid/pup 07a 1.34 1.99 0.00 29.53 
urban status 07 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
% edu dis 07 52.76 18.66 0.00 99.90 
Δ fed fund 02-07b  876.86 1182.63 -463.51 27322.30 
total chapter 312 07 0.58 1.70 0.00 17.00 
chapter 41 status 07 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for Districts, Late Study Period (2008-2014) 
a Expressed in hundreds of thousands of 2007 dollars 
b Expressed in 2007 dollars 
Outcome Model 
To estimate the effect of abatement participation on districts’ industrial property 
tax base, and by inference on industrial firm investment, I continue to draw from the list of 
regressors that Dalehite uses in his evaluation of the Indiana abatement program. The 
following section contains a description and justification for each outcome model variable. 
See Table 9 for a concise description of all variables in the outcome model. 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable for the outcome model is change in assessed industrial 
property value over the course of the study period (i.e. 2003-2007, 2008-2014, or 2003-
2014). In his study, Dalehite uses assessed personal property value as a proxy for industrial 
investment. However, Texas provides data on industrial property tax assessments. This 
should improve the specificity and validity of the outcome model. 
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Variable Description 
eb 1=adopted an active abatement agreement from 2003-2007; 0=all else 
lb 1=adopted an active abatement agreement from 2008-2014; 0=all else 
totabate 1=adopted an active abatement agreement between 2003-2014; 0=all else 
Δ assess ind/pupil Change in assessed industrial property value per pupil (in either ’07 or ’14 
dollars) 
Δ tax rate Change in district’s total tax rate per $100 (M&O and I&S together) 
Δ exp/pupila Change in expenditures per pupil (in either ’07 or ’13 dollars) 
Δ educational attain.b Change in the percentage of the population over age 25 with a high school 
degree or higher 
Δ pov Change in the percentage of children living in poverty 
Δ pop share Change in the district’s share of the state population 
Table 9: Variable Definitions for OLS Outcome Model 
aThe most recent expenditure per pupil data from TEA were for the 2012-2013 academic year. 
b Educational attainment data were only available for the year 2000 from the Decennial Census and 2009 
from the 5-year ACS estimates. Therefore, the change in educational attainment is measured from 2000-
2009, 2000-2014, and 2009-2014 for each study period, respectively. 
Note: Unless otherwise specified, Δ refers to change over the course of one of the following study periods: 
2003-2007, 2003-2014, or 2008-2014. For notes on data sources, see the Appendix. This table was adapted 
from Dalehite (2005) for Texas and this replication study. 
Independent Variables 
I test the following variables to evaluate their effect on districts’ industrial property 
tax base. The outcome model uses a fixed effects OLS regression approach that contains 
only the matched pairs from the selection model for each study period. The model controls, 
therefore, for fixed effects and covariates from the selection model. As Dalehite explains, 
influential factors that vary across states are not relevant to this intra-state study, as those 
variables (e.g. energy costs) can be considered fixed effects. They are expected to be 
constant across districts. Some intra-state and intra-regional variables such as 
transportation infrastructure, additionally, can be considered fixed effects within the 
limited duration of the study period from 2003-2014. Dalehite identifies the following as 
influential at the intra-regional and intra-state level. 
Abatement Participation: 
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The most important independent outcome variable is the dummy for abatement 
participation, constituting the “treatment” in this quasi-experiment. Districts are assigned 
1 if they have granted at least one abatement during the study period and 0 if not. Dalehite’s 
results show that abatement participation is associated with an increase in personal property 
tax assessment. However, given the mixed findings in the literature on the effect of 
abatements on firm siting, I do not offer a hypothesis on the direction of this variable.  
Additionally, Dalehite runs three outcome regression models, assessing the effect 
of early and late abatement adoption on districts’ industrial property tax base during three 
periods. I choose to run four outcome regression models. I assess the effects of early 
abatement adoption on growth in the industrial tax base between 2003 and 2007, as well 
as between 2003 and 2014. I include the longer-term early abatement model to examine 
evaluate whether effects occur over a longer-term period. I then assess the effects of 
abatement adoption over the course of the whole study period from 2003-2014, and the 
effects of late abatement adoption during the late period from 2008-2014. 
Change in the Tax Rate: 
Additional fiscal variables may affect the growth or reduction in industrial property 
values over time. In particular, Dalehite includes the nominal tax rate as a variable that may 
influence industrial property investment. I have already controlled for this variable in the 
propensity score matching process, so I anticipate some collinearity. As Dalehite explains, 
the school district tax rate is only partially reflective of the local tax burden faced by firms. 
Municipal tax rates also play a role. However, accurately assessing the total tax burden 
faced by firms from overlapping jurisdictions is complex and beyond the scope of this 
report. I have already controlled for Chapter 312 adoption by overlapping jurisdictions, 
and the school district tax rate is more easily measurable and localized to the district itself. 
Therefore, I continue Dalehite’s approach and use the district-level variable. 
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Change in Expenditures per Pupil: 
Following Dalehite’s example, I also control for change in expenditures per pupil 
over the course of the study period. Dalehite proposes this as an indicator of educational 
quality and investment in the labor force. Education investments, he posits, may make the 
district more attractive to firms seeking a skilled labor pool. Educational expenditures are 
only a proxy for quality, however, and may be somewhat endogeneous with the dependent 
variable, as investments per pupil may increase as industrial firm siting increases. There 
may also be some collinearity with tax rates. These limitations are present and identified 
in Dalehite’s work, as well. 
Despite these weaknesses, this may be the best measure of educational investment 
and quality available. The Texas Education Agency provides some data on test scores, but 
data are unavailable for key study years for a large percentage of schools in the sample. 
Not wanting to bias the results, I elected to follow Dalehite’s approach and include change 
in educational expenditures per pupil in the model. 
Change in Educational Attainment:  
The second educational variable that I incorporate is educational attainment, using 
American Community Survey (ACS) district-level data. I incorporate educational 
attainment as a proxy for labor pool quality, as does Dalehite. In my model, I define 
educational attainment as the percentage of the population over 25 that has a high school 
degree or higher. Dalehite defines it in the inverse – the percentage without a high school 
degree. Please note that ACS data, especially at the district level are subject to large 
margins of error. Due to limited availability of comparable data, I elected to use 5-year 
ACS estimates and Census data, although the comparison years are not precisely aligned 
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with the study periods. I use ACS and Census data for the following periods: 2000-2009, 
2000-2014, and 2009-2014. 
Change in Child Poverty Rate: 
Using the Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE), I include poverty 
rate in the model as a population factor that may influence firm siting. Dalehite includes 
this variable and posits that firms may choose not to locate in areas with high levels of 
poverty. He interprets poverty level as a type of “amenity,” or lack thereof – with low 
poverty rates being a potential point of attraction for firms. I use the share of the population 
of children living in poverty, which is similar to Dalehite’s measure. As with ACS data, 
SAIPE data are subject to margins are error, but are designed to provide small area 
estimates such as for school districts. 
Change in Share of State Population: 
 To reflect migration and labor pool trends, I include change in share of the state 
population over the study period. Dalehite also incorporates this variable. I use SAIPE data 
for this indicator because estimates are available at the district level for the desired years.   
Table 10 presents descriptive data for the outcome model variables in each study 
period. 
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Study Period Variable Mean SD Min Max 
2003-2007 
(Early Period 1) 
n=50 
Δ assess ind/pupila 1622.56 3673.57 -1623.58 17820.44 
Δ tax rateb 0.50 0.51 0.00 1.00 
Δ exp/pupilc -3.98 1.18 -6.90 0.20 
Δ educational attain 953.46 2264.97 -6713.30 9585.59 
Δ pov 4.40 5.68 -13.81 19.10 
Δ pop shared -0.02 2.50 -5.72 5.92 
2003-2014 
(Early Period 2) 
(n=50) 
Δ assess ind/pupile -4623.68 15057.66 -76413.59 8331.71 
Δ tax rateb 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Δ exp/pupilf 2420.05 6833.80 -5974.61 44680.13 
Δ educational attain 5.60 5.26 -8.75 17.86 
Δ pov 1.86 5.56 -11.51 13.40 
Δ pop shared -20.79 49.48 -263.40 -0.13 
2003-2014 
(Full Period) 
(n=256) 
Δ assess ind/pupile -1386.23 8982.01 -83547.37 9138.76 
Δ tax rateb 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Δ exp/pupilf 1986.77 6873.35 -11515.09 80987.34 
Δ educational attain. 6.41 6.16 -43.16 21.01 
Δ pov 1.75 5.97 -16.77 27.23 
Δ pop shared -9.46 25.74 -263.40 -0.06 
2008 – 2014 
(Late Period) 
N= 230 
Δ assess ind/pupile 1680.53 6326.89 -19525.86 53825.41 
Δ tax rateb 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Δ exp/pupilf -881.13 7604.76 -33024.48 79515.07 
Δ educational attain. 2.49 5.38 -23.90 17.53 
Δ pov 1.55 5.81 -15.80 24.49 
Δ pop shared -6.47 18.69 -207.17 0.00 
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics for Districts in Outcome Model, by Study Period  
a Expressed in hundreds of thousands of 2007 dollars 
b Expressed in tenths of a percent 
c Expressed in 2007 dollars 
d Expressed in hundredths of a percent 
e Expressed in hundreds of thousands of 2014 dollars 
f Expressed in 2013 dollars 
Limitations 
As with any non-experimental study, there are limitations inherent in the regression 
and propensity score matching approach. The design cannot fully control for unobserved, 
omitted variables. Unobserved differences between abating and nonabating districts may 
be responsible for some of the observed differences in abatement participation or industrial 
property growth. Social scientific research is often subject to omitted variable bias, since 
experimental methodologies are unavailable in most social contexts. Therefore, quasi-
experimental methods that mitigate, but do not eliminate, this source of bias must suffice. 
  69 
For example, this study only measures effects from tax abatements adopted during 
one or more of the defined study periods. It does not provide analysis on the effects of any 
pre-existing school property tax abatement agreements that districts may have previously 
adopted under Chapter 312 (prior to the enactment of Chapter 313). The selection model 
tries to account for the presence of Chapter 312 agreements at the city or county level, but 
does not include historical school property tax abatement agreements that may have some 
influence on districts’ growth trajectory. Limiting the study to a single program brings 
consistency to the model and allows me to control for program design differences. 
However, it may also introduce bias if prior abatement agreements affect either 
participation in Chapter 313 or changes in the industrial property tax base. I also exclude 
transit accessibility variables from this study. Future research may wish to control for the 
effects of additional variables, including but not limit to pre-existing abatements and transit 
access. 
A second limitation inherent in regression modeling is model misspecification – 
that is, the relationship between variables may be nonlinear. The models that I use assume 
a linear relationship, and I do not incorporate any interaction terms. I do perform a linktest 
on the selection model to ascertain whether the model is correctly specified, the results of 
which are discussed in Chapter 5. Future research may wish to incorporate interaction 
terms to mitigate against any misspecification. There is also risk of collinearity between 
related variables, which would jeopardize the validity of the regression coefficients. I 
perform tests for collinearity on the selection and outcome variables, the results of which I 
present in Chapter 5. 
A weakness specific to the propensity score matching design is the limited size of 
the constructed samples. In a propensity score matching design, multiple observations are 
dropped from the original population in order to create a sample that is better balanced on 
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the selection covariates. While the new samples may be more comparable, their small size 
can make it more difficult to achieve statistically significant model estimates. In this study, 
only the outcome models are subject to risks imposed by a small sample size. 
Outcome sample size may be of particular concern for the early study period (2003-
2007) which includes only 50 observations. The literature presents mixed 
recommendations as to how large a sample must be in order to provide statistically 
significant results. This challenge is frequently present in propensity score matching in the 
social sciences and is not unique to this study. Holmes and Olsen (2010) discusses the 
different ways to use propensity scoring in social science research, and future research on 
Chapter 313 may wish to employ an alternative methodology that is not subject to the 
weakness of small sample sizes. 
Measurement error is also a possibility for each of the individual variables. There 
are margins of error in school district population estimates, for example, that may cause 
bias in the study results. Similarly, it is possible that the child poverty rate may have a 
different effect on the study outcome than the adult poverty rate. I have operationalized 
each variable as similarly to Dalehite’s study as possible, but in many cases have had to 
adapt the variable based upon what data are available in Texas. There are numerous ways 
to operationalize most of the concepts discussed in this report, and I have attempted to 
choose the most effective method. 
Lastly, it should be emphasized that this evaluation tests the effects of the 
abatement program on district-level firm siting decisions. Nor does the study offer a cost-
benefit analysis of the program. While important, these questions are beyond the scope of 
this report. This study attempts to evaluate whether the program induces siting at the district 
level in an effort to understand whether the program exacerbates property wealth inequities 
in the school finance system. 
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Similarly, external validity is likely a challenge, due simply to the complexity and 
uniqueness of Texas’ abatement program and school finance system. Findings from this 
study may bear some importance for states operating programs with similar features. 
However, the reader should be cautious against making generalizations about abatements 
or school property tax abatements from a state and program with very specific design 
features. 
SURVEY DESIGN 
 To help contextualize the quantitative findings, I conduct an electronic survey of 
school board officials. Due to the limited response rate, findings from the survey are 
presented in tandem with the discussion of quantitative findings in Chapter 6. I do not 
present standalone survey findings in this report. The following sections describe 
methodological choices for the survey. 
Participants 
The author electronically surveyed 153 school district superintendents and 92 
school board presidents in Texas school districts hosting at least one active abatement 
agreement. Of the population that received the online survey through e-mail, 11 
superintendents (7%) and 5 school board presidents (5%) completed the survey. There are 
currently a total of 157 public school districts hosting active abatements and 1,024 public 
school districts statewide. The survey population, therefore, represents a partial and 
selective sample, limited by the availability of contact information for school officials and 
the low survey response rates. 
Materials 
 The survey was conducted online via the Qualtrics electronic survey platform. The 
authored e-mailed the survey to school board presidents and superintendents. The survey 
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was comprised of 44 questions about participants’ attitudes toward and experience with the 
Chapter 313 program. Participants did not necessarily answer all 44 questions, but were 
instead directed to the appropriate branch of questions given their responses to previous 
questions. 
Limitations 
Due to selective sampling and low response rates, there are significant limitations 
to the survey data presented in this report. The data cannot be considered representative, 
for the reasons articulated below. Data should be considered only as contextual and as a 
partial foundation for further research. One significant limitation is that the data represent 
only the perspectives of officials in districts hosting abatements. It is possible – even likely 
– that officials in districts not hosting abatements have different perspectives on the 
program.  
Second the author was not able to obtain an e-mail address for each superintendent 
and school board president in the 157 districts hosting abatements. There is no 
comprehensive e-mail directory of school district officials available to the public. As such, 
the researcher constructed the survey list manually (collecting officials’ e-mail addresses 
from public websites or by phone call to the district). While e-mail addresses for most 
superintendents were readily available, a large percentage of school board presidents 
declined to provide e-mail contact information to the public. It is possible that school board 
members who maintain and make available a public e-mail account differ from the 
population of school board members who do not make an e-mail address available. 
Finally, the very low response rate means that the sample cannot be taken as 
representative – even of the narrow population who received the survey. Given these 
limitations, I recommend that survey results be considered in the context of the findings 
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from the rest of the report and used as the foundation for future research questions. The 
reader should not to make inferences about the larger population of school superintendents 
and board presidents based solely on survey results. 
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Chapter 5: Regression Results 
The previous chapter describes the regression and survey methodologies that I use 
to explore districts’ participation in the tax abatement program and the effects of 
participation on firm siting. This chapter presents regression results for the tax abatement 
selection and outcome models, which I obtain through a multivariate, propensity score 
matching research design. The identification strategy and research design draw heavily 
from Dalehite’s 2005 evaluation of the Indiana property tax abatement program, which 
utilizes probit regression and the econometric Heckman correction to control for the effects 
of districts’ self-selection into the abatement program.  
In this study, I identify variables that may influence districts’ decision to participate 
in the program, drawing heavily from Dalehite’s 2005 program evaluation. I use logistic 
regression to identify the factors that most influence program participation and estimate 
probabilities of participation for each district. Using these estimated probabilities, I 
construct matched district pairs for three study periods over the life of the program. Using 
only these matched pairs, I then estimate the effect of program participation on industrial 
property tax values. For the outcome model, I use multivariate OLS regression techniques, 
employing a fixed effects model for the paired matches and additional outcome covariates 
identified by Dalehite (2005). The following sections present the results from the selection 
and outcome regression models. 
SELECTION MODEL RESULTS 
The abatement selection model is designed to predict which districts will choose to 
participate in the abatement program and to illuminate which variables predict 
participation. I estimate the probability of participation using a multivariate logistic 
regression model. Results from the logistic regression will help reveal whether property 
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wealth predicts participation, as hypothesized. Drawing inspiration from Dalehite’s 2005 
two-step approach, I use the estimated probabilities of participation to construct matched 
pairs that will help mitigate against self-selection bias in the outcome model. I include 
variables that Dalehite identifies in his 2005 treatment of the Indiana school district tax 
abatement program, and adapt them to reflect the available data in Texas. 
Collinearity and Specification Tests 
I perform two preliminary diagnostic tests to identify potential sources of error in 
the model. First, I perform a collinearity test using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). 
Collinearity among covariates can skew coefficients for individual predictors and produce 
lower levels of statistical significance than if the collinear terms were not included together. 
The results from the collinearity analysis show a VIF of below 2.5 for all variables 
in the model, for each of the three study periods (see Table 11). A rule of thumb is that 
VIFs of over ten indicate collinearity problems. Therefore, where VIF values are between 
0 and 2.5, some mild collinearity is indicated, but nothing that exceeds standard practice 
or that would jeopardize the predictors’ coefficients or levels of significance. 
Replicating Dalehite’s approach, and in order to gauge whether I correctly specified 
the model, I perform a linktest on the model for each study period. The linktest is designed 
to identify specification errors in a model and can be performed with a command in Stata. 
It is derived from the work of Tukey (1949) and Pregibon (1980). The test works by 
regressing the dependent variable (i.e. abatement participation) on the linear predicted 
values of the dependent variable from the regression model and a linear term representing 
the square of predicted values. If a model is correctly specified (i.e. contains the correct 
predictor variables and applies the correct functional form), then the introduction of 
additional variables should not improve the performance of the model in a statistically 
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significant way. Therefore, a model passes the linktest if the predicted value term is 
statistically significant and the squared term is not. The level of significance of the 
predicted and squared linktest terms are provided in Table 12 in the rows hat and hatsq, 
respectively 
The linktest results for the predicted value term are statistically significant at below 
the 0.10 level for each study period. This suggests that the variables that I have included in 
the model are appropriate. The 2003-2007 and 2008-2014 models also have a statistically 
insignificant squared term (hatsq), indicating that the model has been correctly specified 
and that additional variables or a different functional form would be unlikely to alter the 
predictive power of the model.  
However, the regression for the full study period from 2003-2014 has a squared 
term that is statistically significant at below the 0.10 level. This p-value suggests the 
possibility of omitted variable bias or misspecified functional form (i.e. a nonlinear 
relationship). In an attempt to correct this potential specification error, I iteratively added 
and removed a number of interaction terms from the model. These efforts, however, did 
not improve the performance of the model on the linktest. In fact, the inclusion of additional 
interactive terms, while failing to improve the performance of the model for the 2003-2014 
period, sometimes compromised the performance of the model for other study periods. 
Therefore, I opted to move forward with the model as identified in Chapter 4, with the 
caveat that an omitted variable may introduce bias into the selection results for the full 
study period from 2003-2014.   
During the model identification and specification process, I tested the addition of 
the following interaction terms, but they did not improve the performance of the model: 
 Interaction between assessed or taxable property values and educationally 
disadvantaged students 
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 Interaction between Chapter 41 status and educationally disadvantaged 
students 
 Property tax values squared 
 
Variable VIF (03-07 and 03-14) VIF (08-14) 
tax rate 1.24 1.31 
tot tax value/pup 2.01 1.82 
assess ind/pup 1.36 1.44 
assess resid/pup 1.36 1.32 
urban status 1.24 1.23 
% edu dis 1.43 1.21 
Δ fed fund 1.26 1.13 
total chapter 312 1.04 1.97 
chapter 41 status 2.1 1.25 
Mean VIF 1.45 1.41 
Table 11: Variance Inflation Factors by Study Period 
Selection Model Results 
Predictive Power 
Table 12 presents logistic regression results for all three study periods. All 
regressions are highly significant (at below the 0.01 level). However, the pseudo R-squared 
is low for all three periods, indicating that the predictive power of the model is limited. The 
model is most predictive for the early period from 2003-2007, during which time it predicts 
14% of variation in abatement participation. Regressions for the 2003-2014 and 2008-2014 
periods predict only 5% and 8% of the variation, respectively. The low R-squared for each 
study period could be the result of an omitted variable, especially in the 2003-2014 study 
period which does not pass the linktest. However, it could also be the result of inherent 
variability in program participation. The selection model, at its best, explains 14% of 
variation in the dependent variable, calling for some modesty in drawing inferences.  
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2003 - 2007 2003 - 2014 2008 - 2014 
Coef OR Sig  Coef OR Sig  Coef OR Sig  
tax rate 0.04 1.04 0.98  0.43 1.53 0.59  0.83 2.72 0.34  
tot tax value/pup -0.07 0.93 0.47  0.09 1.09 0.01 * 0.04 1.04 0.01 * 
assess ind/pup 0.28 1.32 0.02 * 0.26 1.29 0.01 * 0.18 1.19 0.01 * 
assess resid/pup -0.06 0.94 0.78  -0.32 0.72 0.06 * -0.51 0.59 0.01 * 
urban status 0.95 2.60 0.05 * 0.17 1.18 0.50  -0.04 0.95 0.89  
% edu dis -0.01 0.99 0.57  0.01 1.01 0.25  0.01 1.01 0.29  
Δ fed fund 0.00 1.00 0.68  0.00 1.00 0.94  0.00 1.00 0.30  
total chapter 312 0.04 1.04 0.21  0.02 1.02 0.57  0.12 1.12 0.03 * 
chapter 41 status 1.50 4.49 0.05 * -0.02 0.98 0.96  0.17 1.23 0.66  
constant -4.05 0.02 0.12  -3.13 0.04 0.01 * -3.27 0.03 0.00 * 
Log Likelihood -100.66    -360.58   -329.24   
Pseudo R2 0.14 *    0.06 *   0.08 *  
Prob > chi2 0.00     0.00    0.00   
Hat (ltest) 0.07     0.00    0.00   
Hatsq (ltest) 0.94     0.06    0.63   
*statistically significant at below the 0.10 level 
Note: OR=Odds Ratio; Total taxable, assessed industrial, and assessed residential property value per pupil 
expressed in hundreds of thousands of dollars. 
Table 12: Selection Model Results 
The characteristics of the logistic regression design itself could also contribute to 
the low R-squared. The logistic regression model requires the treatment variable to take on 
dummy status over a given time period for each district. The predictor variables, however, 
are measured at a single point in time prior to the study period, rather than at a point in 
time immediately prior to the district’s decision to adopt an abatement. If predictor 
variables fluctuate throughout the study period, and abatement decisions are induced by 
short-term fluctuation in covariates, this could introduce bias into the logistic regression 
estimates. The 2003-2014 study period may be especially vulnerable to this potential bias, 
given that it attempts to predict abatement participation over the span of 12 years from 
single 2002 point-in-time predictors. 
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Individual Predictors 
The model’s low predictive power as a whole, however, does not preclude the 
identification of meaningful individual predictors. Even with strong variability in program 
participation across the study population, the model highlights statistically significant 
trends in the data. In particular, the effect of assessed industrial property value per pupil 
(expressed in hundreds of thousands of dollars) is statistically significant at below the 0.05 
level across all study periods. For the full 2003-2014 study period, the odds ratio indicates 
that each additional $100,000 of assessed industrial property per pupil is associated with a 
29% increase in the odds of abatement adoption. Odds ratios for the industrial value per 
pupil are slightly higher (1.32) and lower (1.19) for the early and late study periods, 
respectively.  
The next two variables of importance are total taxable value and assessed 
residential property per pupil. These variables are statistically significant only for the full 
and late study periods. For the full study period, an additional $100,000 in total taxable 
value is associated with a 7% increase in the odds of adopting an abatement. Residential 
property per pupil has a negative directional effect, with an increase of $100,000 associated 
with reduced odds of adopting an abatement (.72 and .59 for each study period, 
respectively). These findings together indicate that, holding constant all other factors, 
higher industrial property values are associated with a higher likelihood of opting into the 
abatement program. Higher residential property values, however, are associated with a 
lower likelihood of participating in the abatement program.  
This finding is consistent with the fiscal zoning hypothesis, which suggests that 
higher income communities may neither require nor desire industrial facilities to locate in 
their jurisdictions. Higher residential property values, as opposed to industrial value, are 
more closely associated with residential income and household wealth. It is unclear why 
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the total taxable value and residential property effects would be present in later study 
periods, but not the early study period. These findings, overall, are consistent with 
Dalehite’s finding that industrial and commercial property values (as opposed to 
residential) are associated with a higher likelihood of abatement.  
An alternative explanation to the fiscal zoning hypothesis is that places with historic 
specializations in manufacturing or industrial activity are striving to maintain their 
competitive advantage in those sectors through the abatement program. There may be a 
path dependence effect at play, influencing existing industrial areas to more aggressively 
pursue industrial development incentives. However, I would also question whether true 
path-dependent economic effects would manifest through increased abatement 
participation. Path dependence would suggest that a jurisdiction’s economic history 
dictates its economic future, and that certain outcomes and patterns of development are 
“locked-in.” Jurisdictions’ participation in the abatement program itself seems to indicate 
that there is at least a perception that an industrial history is insufficient to guarantee future 
competitiveness in that arena. Additional research and an economic history of districts 
participating in abatement agreements would be required to understand whether path 
dependence is a viable explanation. For further information on the theory of path 
dependence and economic development see Paul David’s 2000 work, “Path dependence, 
its critics, and the quest for ‘historical economics.’” 
Additional predictors of note are observable in the early study period from 2003 – 
2007. Urban district and Chapter 41 status are statistically significant and have a 
meaningful effect on the odds of entering into an abatement agreement. During the early 
period, the odds of an urban district adopting an abatement are 2.6 times higher than the 
odds for a non-urban district, holding other covariates constant. This aligns with Dalehite’s 
finding that abatements are more likely to be an urban phenomenon, especially early in the 
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program’s lifespan. As with Dalehite’s probit regression estimations, the effect of a 
district’s urban status on abatement participation is not statistically significant in later study 
periods. 
For the early study period, Chapter 41 status is statistically significant at below the 
.05 level and is associated with a sizable odds ratio. Holding other covariates constant, the 
odds of a Chapter 41 school participating in the abatement program are 4.5 times higher 
than the odds for a non-Chapter 41 school. This is consistent with my hypothesis that 
school districts subject to revenue recapture from the state are more likely to grant 
abatements to firms – since this allows them to shelter local revenue from state recapture 
and they do not experience a reduction in state school aid. This finding is as anticipated 
and consistent with the hypothesis that property-rich districts with donor status to the 
school finance system will be more likely to offer abatements.  
However, this factor is only statistically significant in the program’s early period. 
The full and late study periods do not feature Chapter 41 status as a statistically significant 
predictive variable. It is possible that property-wealthy Chapter 41 schools were early 
adopters of the program because they have a strong incentive to keep their tax revenues in 
their local district. It is also possible that a policy change, or simply expanded knowledge 
of the program over time, contributed to a proliferation of abatements among non-Chapter 
41 districts in later years.  It appears that both industrial wealth and a district’s position in 
the school finance system incentivize abatement participation in Texas for early abaters. 
For the 2008-2014 late study period, the only remaining statistically significant 
predictor with a meaningful coefficient size is the number of Chapter 312 agreements in 
the district’s overlapping jurisdictions (city and county). A district located in an area with 
an additional Chapter 312 agreement has odds of adopting an abatement 1.12 times higher 
than a district lacking that additional 312 agreement. While the odds ratio is not as large as 
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for the dummies of Chapter 41 or urban status in prior study periods, this is to be expected 
given the variable’s unit size. One additional agreement produces a 12% increase in the 
odds of hosting an abatement. Many jurisdictions host multiple Chapter 312 agreements. 
In 2002, for example, the Harris County area was home to 24 Chapter 312 agreements 
(granted either by the county or cities within the county). Chapter 312 agreements are not 
an influential predictor in earlier periods, and neither Chapter 41 nor urban status are 
predictive during the late bird time period.  
Notably, the tax rate is not statistically significant in any period. This would seem 
to indicate that either the fiscal health or stress hypotheses are not applicable, or that tax 
rate is not an adequate indicator of stress or health in this context. The differential between 
the effects of industrial and residential property may provide some evidence for the fiscal 
stress hypothesis since increased residential property is associated with a lower probability 
of abatement, indicating that wealthier communities with similar levels of industrial 
property are less likely to grant abatements. It appears that some communities may be 
relying on industrial firm attraction as an economic base, but as residential property values 
increase there is less desire or need to attract those firms. Future research should also 
explore whether path dependent effects are at play, and whether historically industrial 
economies more aggressively pursue industrial property tax abatements. Again, see David 
(2000) for a discussion of path dependent economic development. 
The results of this logistic regression analysis, therefore, replicate several of 
Dalehite’s findings in Texas. The selection model does not decidedly confirm that a 
district’s level of fiscal burden (measured through tax rate, controlled for through property 
tax values) predicts its participation in the abatement program in Texas. Industrial property 
tax values, however, are predictive of abatement status. This suggests that there is a 
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relationship between fiscal conditions in the community and the decision to offer 
abatements.  
Chapter 41 status, moreover, is strongly predictive in the early period. While this 
result does not hold into later periods, it may still be meaningful in discussions about the 
effects of the program on school finance. Some of the abatement agreements adopted 
during the early study period are still in place, and the state may still be feeling the effects 
of these abatement on its school finance system.  
Urban status loses its predictive power in later periods, as well. Again, this is 
perhaps due to the proliferation of the policy among late adopting districts due to their 
limited knowledge or capacity. It may also be reflective of a policy change during the 
program’s operation. Lastly, the introduction of Chapter 312 agreements as a predictor 
yields interesting results. The proliferation of both Chapter 313 and 312 agreements 
appears to be occurring throughout the lifespan of Chapter 313. This may provide evidence 
for the copycat or positive feedback loop hypotheses that areas granting abatements tend 
to grant even more abatements over time. Moreover, if a city or county offers a 312 
abatement that affects a neighboring school district in a multi-district county, then a district 
might feel pressure to compete intra-regionally by offering its own incentives. More 
research would be required to understand the interaction between Chapter 312 and 313 
agreements fully. 
PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING AND OUTCOME MODEL RESULTS 
After estimating the selection model, I use a propensity score matching study design 
to estimate the effects of abatement participation on a district’s industrial property tax base. 
This approach is inspired by, though not identical to, Dalehite’s two-step Heckman 
correction design. I use results from the logistic regression to identify school district pairs 
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that have similar probabilities of participating in the abatement program and are therefore 
balanced with regard to the selection covariates. This design has the benefit of enhancing 
comparability across “treatment” and “control” districts on observable covariates, despite 
their self-selection into the program.  
This section describes the results from the propensity score matching process, 
demonstrating the comparability of matched pairs on the selected covariates. I then present 
outcome model estimates for the three study periods (early, full, and late). In addition to 
the explanatory abatement variable, I control for covariates identified by Dalehite in 2005 
as potentially contributing to increases in the industrial tax base over time. 
Model Accuracy and Covariate Balance in Matched Pairs 
This section discusses the accuracy and overlapping of the selection model’s 
estimated abatement probabilities, since I use those probabilities to produce matched pairs 
and control for self-selection bias in the outcome model. I also discuss the balance of 
covariates in the matched pairs that are constructed from the predicted probabilities as a 
way to ensure comparability between abating and non-abating districts.  
As discussed previously, the selection model has somewhat low predictive power. 
The pseudo R-squared statistic is low for all study periods, suggesting that the model as a 
whole does not predict a large percentage of the variation in districts’ decision to adopt a 
tax abatement. Figures 1, 2, and 3 show the frequency of estimated abatement probabilities 
for the early, late, and full study periods by observed abatement status. In all three study 
periods, most districts have an estimated abatement probability of less than 0.50. This is 
true of both the observed non-abating and abating districts. 
In the full study population, only a minority of districts maintain active abatement 
agreements. In the early period, only 25 (2.5%) of 999 school districts offered an abatement 
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between 2003 and 2007. In the total and late adopter categories, these numbers rise to 128 
(13%) and 115 (12%), respectively. The selection model, therefore, correctly predicts that 
most districts won’t participate in the abatement program. However, the model 
underestimates the probably of abatement participation, as can be seen by the lack of 
predicted probabilities over 0.50 in the observed abatement group. 
In order to be useful in the propensity matching context, the selection model needs 
to discriminate somewhat between abaters and nonabaters but also have sufficient overlap 
in probabilities to produce comparably matched pairs. As demonstrated by the box plots in 
Figures 1-3, the model discriminates more effectively between abaters and nonabaters 
during the later study periods, but still underestimates the probability of abatement. The 
selection model as a whole does not discriminate extraordinarily well between abaters and 
nonabaters. The model does, however, provide sufficient overlap in predicted probability 
scores to provide effectively matched pairs of abating and nonabating districts, as 
evidenced by the grey overlapping box plot areas. 
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Figure 1: Frequency of Abatement Probabilities for Early Study Period (2003-2007) 
Note: Zero and 1 on the horizontal axis refer to observed abatement status (i.e. 0=did not grant an abatement 
between 2003-2007, 1=granted an abatement between 2003-2007). 
 
 
Figure 2: Frequency of Abatement Probabilities for Late Study Period (2008-2014) 
Note: Zero and 1 on the horizontal axis refer to observed abatement status (i.e. 0=did not grant an abatement 
between 2008-2014, 1=granted an abatement between 2008-2014). 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
P
r(
e
a
rl
y
b
ir
d
)
0 1
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
P
r(
la
te
b
ir
d
)
0 1
  87 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Frequency of Abatement Probabilities for Full Study Period (2003-2014) 
Note: Zero and 1 on the horizontal axis refer to observed abatement status (i.e. 0=did not grant an abatement 
between 2003-2014, 1=granted an abatement between 2003-2014). 
 
I use the probability of abatement, generated from the logistic selection model, to 
match abating districts with nonabating districts based on their shared level of abatement 
probability. If the matching process is successful, I expect to see improved balance on the 
covariates within the matched study population. These improvements are observable in 
Tables 13 and 14. In Table 13, which displays selection covariate statistics from the full 
unmatched study population, large discrepancies are observable between abaters and 
nonabaters. These differences would make it difficult to compare the abatement with the 
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growth) could be attributable to any of these self-selection factors. In particular, the 
unmatched study population has large observable differences in taxable and assessed 
property variables, as well as urban status, Chapter 41 status, and other variables. 
By comparison, the matched study samples (see Table 14) are more balanced on 
these covariates. With the exception of Chapter 312 status, the districts appear to be better 
matched on virtually all covariates than they were prior to matching. The matching process 
does not eliminate differences between the two groups, but takes important steps toward 
controlling for severe differences in, for example, Chapter 41 status, urban status, and 
taxable value. It is unclear why the Chapter 312 variable appears more poorly balanced in 
unmatched than the matched population. 
 
abatement status 
2002 - 2007 2002 - 2014 2008 - 2014 
0 1 0 1 0 1 
n 974 25 871 128 884 115 
tax rate 1.54 1.56 1.54 1.53 1.19 1.17 
tot tax value/pup 2.72 4.83 2.56 4.21 4.17 8.24 
assess ind/pup 0.32 2.43 0.28 1.01 0.44 1.27 
assess resid/pup 0.87 1.05 0.90 0.68 1.35 0.84 
urban status 0.25 0.48 0.26 0.25 0.28 0.23 
% edu dis 48.06 41.28 47.64 49.63 52.74 54.58 
Δ fed fund -201.19 -180.46 -199.38 -209.46 877.95 969.65 
total chapter 312 0.50 1.64 0.52 0.61 0.58 0.80 
chapter 41 status 0.08 0.36 0.07 0.18 0.13 0.26 
probability 0.02 0.12 0.12 0.18 0.11 0.18 
Table 13: Covariate Balance, Unmatched Abaters and Nonabaters, by Study Period 
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abatement status 
2002 - 2007 2002 - 2014 2008 - 2014 
0 1 0 1 0 1 
 25 pairs 128 pairs 91 pairs 
tax rate 1.53 1.56 1.54 1.53 1.16 1.17 
tot tax value/pup 4.79 4.83 4.04 4.21 6.82 8.24 
assess ind/pup 2.08 2.43 0.75 1.01 1.16 1.27 
assess resid/pup 0.72 1.05 0.69 0.68 0.81 0.84 
urban status 0.40 0.48 0.27 0.25 0.24 0.23 
% edu dis 46.28 41.28 50.25 49.63 54.91 54.58 
Δ fed fund -184.84 -180.46 -218.56 -209.46 1079.26 969.65 
total chapter 312 1.40 1.64 1.05 0.61 1.00 0.80 
chapter 41 status 0.44 0.36 0.16 0.18 0.26 0.26 
probability 0.10 0.12 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.18 
Table 14: Covariate Balance, Matched Abaters and Nonabaters 
The matching process was reasonably successful, and can be expected to control 
for most of the observed covariates. Importantly, however, propensity matching has its 
limitations. As discussed in Chapter 4, this process does not control for unobserved 
covariates. It is possible that other unaccounted for variables influence the outcome. I 
control for some additional outcome covariates identified by Dalehite in 2005 in the final 
outcome model.  
Additionally, the propensity score matching design works by eliminating 
unmatched nonabaters from the study population. Limiting the control group to comparable 
districts allows for a quasi-experimental evaluation of the program. However, a large 
population of nonabating districts are by design then excluded from the evaluation. These 
reduced sample sizes may be more prone to delivering results with high levels of statistical 
insignificance. 
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Outcome Model Results 
For the selection model, I produced three regression models (one for each period). 
However, for the outcome model, I estimate four outcome models. This is a departure from 
Dalehite (who only estimates three outcome models). I elect to estimate the effects of early 
abatement adoption both for the early study period and over the course of the full study 
period.  
Therefore, for early adopters, I present findings for both the 2003-2007 period and 
2003-2014 period. I believe this additional model will help elucidate whether there are 
effects from early abatement participation that are only observable over a longer span of 
time. It is possible, for example, that the effects of abatement adoption do not take full 
effect on property assessment until 5-10 years following adoption of the agreement. I then 
present findings for the late group from 2008-2014, and the total abatement group from 
2003-214.  
Collinearity 
As with the selection model, I perform a test for collinearity among independent 
outcome variables. I examine the VIF for each variable in each study period. See the results 
in Table 15 below. The first early study period model (2003-2007) has very low VIFs, 
indicating very mild but ultimately unconcerning levels of collinearity. The remainder of 
the models, however, all indicate severe collinearity with the tax rate variable. In fact, I 
was unable to run a VIF test including tax rate without an error for these latter study 
periods. Due to this challenge, I omitted the tax rate variable from the VIF test. The tax 
variable is also omitted in the outcome model estimations that follow. 
After omitting the tax rate variable, the VIF for remaining variables in later study 
periods all fall below 2, indicating acceptably mild levels of collinearity. After removing 
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tax rate, I do not anticipate collinearity to bias the coefficients or levels of significance for 
the outcome estimates. 
 
Variable VIF (03-07 eb1) VIF (03-14 eb2) VIF (03-14 tot) VIF (08-14) 
earlybird abate. 1.07 1.04 - - 
latebird abate. - - - 1.01 
all abate. - - 1.02 - 
Δ tax rate 1.11 Collin. Error Collin. Error Collin. Error 
Δ exp. per pupil 1.24 1.12 1.02 1 
Δ educ. attain. 1.16 1.18 1.02 1.01 
Δ poverty 1.03 1.2 1.02 1.02 
Δ pop share 1.12 1.13 1.03 1.01 
constant 1.11 1.12 1.02 1 
Mean VIF 1.12 1.09 1.02 1.01 
Table 15: Collinearity Test for Outcome Variables 
Predictive Power 
Table 16 presents outcome results for the OLS regression model for the four 
regression periods identified above (including two models for early adopters). The 
predictive power of the model is low or statistically insignificant in each period. The two 
early adopter regressions have R-squareds that are not statistically significant, suggesting 
that the model’s predictions may not be reliably interpreted. The first early adopter 
regression for 2003-2007, in particular, has a very high level of statistical insignificance. 
The low levels of statistical significance may, in part, be attributable to the reduced sample 
population for this group. These early adoption group has a sample population of only 50. 
The full and late adoption periods have statistically significant but low R-squareds 
of .03 and .07, respectively. This indicates that the models explain only 3% and 7% of 
variation in changes in assessed industrial property value over the respective study periods. 
Omitted variable bias remains a weakness of this, and any, statistical regression model. 
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Please see Chapter 4 for a discussion of model limitations. However, the propensity 
matching design controls for at least some variation due to program self-selection, 
including urban status. Urban status may act as a reasonable proxy for other omitted, but 
potentially influential, variables such as infrastructure Despite the low predictive power of 
the overall models, we can still look at individual covariates for more information about 
factors that influence growth in assessed industrial property value. 
 
Δ indust. 
assessment 
2003 – 2007 
(earlyabate1) 
2003 – 2014 
(earlyabate2) 
2003 – 2014 
(all) 
2008 – 2014 
(late) 
Coef Sig  Coef Sig  Coef Sig  Coef Sig  
earlybird abate. 720.63 0.58  -5110.82 0.16  - -  - -  
latebird abate. - -  - -  - -  1141.68 0.14  
all abate. - -  - -  -501.39 0.65  - -  
Δ tax rate -266.06 0.74  Omitted Collin.  Omitted Collin.  Omitted Collin.  
Δ exp. per pupil 0.03 0.95  0.10 0.77  -0.14 0.22  -0.06 0.44  
Δ educ. attain. 19.85 0.91  -97.17 0.82  75.59 0.55  61.25 0.57  
Δ poverty -253.38 0.53  474.74 0.33  -66.36 0.59  89.52 0.34  
Δ pop share -143.91 0.61  45.43 0.38  97.32 0.00*  -90.04 0.00 * 
constant 173.43 0.96  -1714.81 0.66  -298.69 0.80  188.13 0.77  
N 50   50   256   230   
Pairs 25   25   128   115   
R-squared 0.11    .01  . .03*   .07*   
Prob > F 0.97   .52   .04   .02   
*statistically significant at below the 0.10 level 
Table 16: Outcome Model Results 
Note: Δ industrial assess. Expressed in hundreds of thousands of dollars, Δ tax rate expressed in tenths 
of a percent, dollar values adjusted for inflation within study periods (e.g. early study period expressed 
in 2007 dollars etc.) 
 
Explanatory Variables and Individual Predictors 
The explanatory variable (i.e. abatement participation) bears no statistically 
significant predictive power across any of the four study periods. The coefficients for the 
2003-2007 early study period and full 2003-2014 period (with all abaters) are particularly 
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insignificant with p-values of over 0.50. The results for the early adopter sample from 
2003-2014 and the later study period from 2008-2014 are more significant (with p-values 
between 0.10 and 0.20), but they do not comply with standard conventions for levels of 
significance. They are not strong enough to justify inferences about the program.  
Moreover, the direction of the coefficients in each of these more significant periods 
contradict each other (with the early adopter 2003-2014 results suggesting a negative 
directional relationship and the late study period a positive relationship). While it is 
tempting to interpret these coefficients and posit hypotheses about the causes of these 
contradictions, I do not believe this would be a productive exercise. We cannot, with 
reasonable probability, infer that these coefficients are statistically different from zero.  
These regression results, therefore, suggest that participating in Chapter 313 bears 
no statistically discernable relationship to growth in a district’s industrial property tax base. 
There is no statistically significant evidence from this regression that granting an abatement 
has helped to expand the industrial property tax base of a community and, by extension, 
driven firms to locate in a jurisdiction. When controlling for other factors that plausibly 
affect firm siting and program self-selection, the decision to grant abatements appears to 
have no statistically discernable relationship to growth in the industrial property tax base. 
The implication is that a firm’s decision to make industrial property investments in a 
community are just as likely to occur without a tax abatement as with one. Or, at least, our 
model provides us with no evidence to refute that possibility.  
Among the outcome covariates, only one statistically significant relationship is 
observable in the model estimates. In both the full and late adopter study periods from 
2003-2014 (with all abaters) and 2008-2014 (with late abaters), respectively, the change in 
a jurisdiction’s share of the state population is highly statistically significant when 
predicting changes in the industrial property tax base. However, the directions of the 
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coefficients contradict one another. For the later period, the coefficient of -90.04, 
(expressed in hundreds of thousands of dollars), is negative while in the full period it is 
positive at 97.32. Therefore, during 2008-2014, each additional hundredths of a percentage 
point increase in the jurisdiction’s share of state population is associated with $9,004,000 
decrease in the industrial property tax values, when accounting for all other variables. In 
the full study period, however, a hundredths of a percentage point increase in the state 
population is associated with a $9,732,000 increase in the assessed industrial property 
value.  
It is unclear why this discrepancy would be observable between the two study 
periods. A decrease in the assessed value of industrial property could occur for a number 
of reasons. For example, the fiscal zoning hypothesis might suggest that, as districts’ 
populations grow and the area demonstrates its desirability to incoming residents, 
communities will be less likely to recruit industrial firms and may choose to zone industrial 
uses out of the city to cater to an incoming residential population. Industrial companies 
may also decide voluntarily to relocate if the area becomes congested or difficult to conduct 
industrial activities within due to population increases.  
A growing share of the state population could also cause increases in industrial 
property values if population centers provide amenities and assets for industrial firms. It is 
possible that, as certain locales become population growth centers, this creates a local labor 
supply and additional amenities that are attractive for firms. It is unclear why the direction 
of the coefficient would switch between the two periods. More research may elucidate 
reasons for this discrepancy. For example, future research may choose to analyze shifts in 
program or industry participation over time. For example, perhaps the employment-lite but 
property-intensive development of wind farms in rural Texas may explain the negative 
association between industrial property values and population growth during the latter half 
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of the study period. The driver may be due to shifts in the mix of industrial firms across 
regions. 
Regardless of underlying explanations, it is clear from the estimates that share of 
population growth is a more confident predictor of changes in industrial property values 
(and, by implication, firm siting) than abatement status. Holding population growth and 
other factors constant, abatements don’t appear to be influential in the growth or shrinking 
of the industrial base. While industrial property wealth prior to the study period appears to 
predict abatement participation, abatement participation does not predict growth in 
property wealth over time. 
None of the other covariates are statistically significant. Changes in educational 
attainment or spending per pupil are statistically insignificant. Poverty rates are 
insignificant, as are tax rates for the early period. As indicated previously, tax rates have 
been omitted from later models due to issues with collinearity.  
The findings from the outcome model differ from Dalehite’s findings. Dalehite 
finds that abatement participation has a statistically significant effect on changes to 
assessed personal property values over time. He finds that abatement participation is 
associated with growth in personal property assessments, which he uses as a proxy for 
industrial investment. Dalehite thus concludes that participating in abatements, at the 
district-level, has some effect on firm-siting and only further exacerbates property wealth 
disparities between districts. Data in Texas, however, are available on industrial property 
assessments, both real and personal. Findings from this study show an absence of evidence 
indicating that abatement participation produces industrial firm investment. While 
wealthier districts are more likely to participate in Texas, and receive some benefits from 
participation in the form of sheltering local revenues from the state finance system, there 
is no indication that participation further enhances the industrial property tax base of the 
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district. Differences in data, as well as study design, may be responsible for these disparate 
findings. 
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
The previous chapters provided background on the school property tax abatement 
program in Texas and reviewed findings from a quantitative analysis of program 
participation and its effect on industrial property investment. This chapter will synthesize 
the findings from previous chapters with results from the qualitative survey data in order 
to delineate overarching findings for the program. 
FINDING 1 
Industrial Property Wealth Predicts Chapter 313 Participation 
Districts with higher pre-existing industrial property values are more likely to grant 
an abatement, controlling for a variety of fiscal and population factors. This is true for both 
early and later study periods, as well as over the program’s full lifespan from 2003-2014. 
Logistic regression results show that each additional $100,000 in previously assessed 
industrial property value is associated with a 29% increase in the odds of granting an 
abatement over the lifespan of the program. This result replicates Dalehite’s finding in 
Indiana. This relationship exists controlling for a number of potentially influential factors 
such as tax rate, residential property values, urban status, and percentage of educationally 
disadvantaged students, for example (see Chapter 4 for a description of all variables that 
the selection model controls for).  
Dalehite posits that, in Indiana, jurisdictions may be engaging in a proactive effort 
to form “agglomeration” economies through the abatement program. That is, jurisdictions 
use abatements in an attempt to attract firms from a specific industry, in order to capture 
the positive spillover effects from firm colocation. While this theory may apply when cities 
grant abatements, as is the case in Indiana, I am skeptical of whether school districts engage 
in this level of economic development planning. Cities often maintain economic 
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development offices dedicated to examining import substitution or cluster strategies. 
School district boards, however, typically attend to educational operations and school 
finance and do not necessarily have economic development offices that engage in this level 
of economic planning. 
This finding may, alternatively, provide some evidence for the fiscal zoning 
hypothesis, when considered in conjunction with residential property values. The 
regression results show that, over the course of the full study period (but especially in the 
later study period from 2008-2014), higher assessed residential property values are 
associated with a lower likelihood of granting an abatement. The implication is that 
districts with wealthy residents choose not to offer industrial abatements, potentially due 
to these facilities being “LULUs,” or locally unwanted land uses. As residential property 
values increase, the likelihood of abatement declines. When industrial property values 
increase, the likelihood of abatement increases, suggesting that some communities may use 
industrial firm incentives as a way to buoy an otherwise insufficient residential tax base. 
Residents are willing to trade fiscal benefits for environmental quality as residential 
property values rise. More research may wish to explore the fiscal zoning hypothesis and 
its application to Texas’ Chapter 313 program. 
Alternatively, this phenomenon could stem from historic economic development 
trends in these school districts. It is possible that regions with high levels of historic 
industrial development are more likely to grant abatements in order to maintain their 
historic competitive advantage in this sector. More research would be necessary to 
understand whether historic development patterns explain abatement participation.  
Regardless of causal mechanism, the policy implications of this dynamic remain the same. 
Districts with higher industrial property values are more likely to participate in (and 
therefore reap any benefits from) the abatement program. 
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Dalehite’s primary concern is whether the school abatement program confers an 
inequitable distribution of benefits to an already fiscally privileged class of districts. This 
study has attempted to understand whether this is true in Texas, as well. In Texas, districts 
that participate in the abatement program receive indirect subsidies for participation via the 
state school aid formulas, as well as supplemental PILOTs directly from the firms 
themselves. Wealthy districts with redistributive obligations under Chapter 41 are also able 
to shelter some portion of local tax revenue from state recapture via Chapter 313. The 
inequitable distribution of fiscal benefits to participating districts would only be further 
compounded if the program achieved its economic objectives of driving industrial firm 
siting to these jurisdictions. Dalehite, for example, finds that in Indiana, the abatement 
program is effective at driving investment into participating districts, which only enables 
wealthy districts to become wealthier.  
Findings from this report do not corroborate Dalehite’s latter finding, since the 
model shows no evidence of a relationship between abatements and growth in industrial 
property values (see Finding 3, below). However, the finding that industrial property values 
predict participation remains significant, since it means wealthy districts are receiving state 
subsidies through the school aid formulas as well as PILOTs directly from firms. These 
payments enhance a school’s wealth and resources outside of the redistributive school 
finance system. If wealthy schools are receiving more money via PILOTs than less wealthy 
schools, then the program may exacerbate resource disparities.  
Moreover, even if the program fails to drive firm siting to participating districts, 
the state still provides an indirect subsidy to districts by maintaining their state school aid 
at the same level as prior to the abatement, despite any growth in the property tax base that 
might occur from that firm siting decision. If abatements do not drive firm siting, and if 
firms would have located in the district without the abatement, then these districts would 
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have otherwise experienced a reduction in state funding. The state, therefore, is paying 
proeprty-wealthy districts more than it otherwise would via artificially inflated levels of 
school aid. 
FINDING 2  
Early in the Program, Chapter 41 and Urban Status Predict Participation 
 The quantitative results show that a district’s prior Chapter 41 status predicts 
abatement participation in the early years of the program’s operation (2003-2007). Being 
a Chapter 41 school in 2002 increases the odds of participating in an abatement between 
2003 and 2007 by over 400%. This is consistent with Finding 1, since industrial wealth is 
associated with abatement participation and taxable property value is one component in 
determining Chapter 41 status. However, both of these relationships exist when holding 
the other variable constant. In other words, Chapter 41 status is statistically significant even 
when holding total taxable value and industrial property wealth constant. In other words, 
it's not just proeprty wealth that is predictive, but the district’s classification as a donor 
school in the state’s redistributive school finance system. 
 The positive relationship between Chapter 41 status and abatement participation is 
corroborated in a review of news coverage (see Chapter 3) as well as survey data on the 
program. To supplement quantitative findings, I conducted a survey of district officials in 
Chapter 313 districts. Five out of seven district said that they supported one or more tax 
abatement agreements because they anticipated losing revenue to the state’s redistribution 
system as a function of their district’s Chapter 41 status. None of the four school board 
presidents who answered this question said that they voted for an abatement due to Chapter 
41 status, however.  
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Five out of seven superintendents also identified “less local tax revenue foregone 
to the state's redistribution program” as a benefit of the abatement program for Chapter 41 
districts. Two out of four board presidents agreed that this was a benefit for Chapter 41 
districts. One superintendent shared the following sentiments regarding the abatement 
program: 
313s are essential for Ch. 41 districts, due to us sending OUR MONEY 
back to the state. It is our money that our moms and dads generate.  If 
other districts want the wealth we have, then put leaders in place that 
will attract that level of business to their districts.  We take a huge hit 
from the beginning with the way the refineries value their property, due 
to the mid-point evaluations they use.  We will not only continue to 
enter into 313s, but I will aggressively negotiate the agreements to 
acquire money above and beyond what is 'in ' the agreement.  My main 
job as a 41 supt is to keep as much of OUR MONEY as possible and 
look for other revenue generating opportunities as we go.  Big business 
is good for these communities and our moms and dads and our district.  
I will continue to lead the way in this area. 
 This superintendent says that he or she will seek out “money above and beyond 
what is ‘in’ the agreement,” in likely reference to PILOTs. Thus, there is evidence to 
suggest that the program’s design, and in particular the supplemental payment provision, 
makes Chapter 313 especially attractive to Chapter 41 schools. Chapter 41 districts must 
return revenues above an excess per capita threshold to the state. Some Chapter 41 district 
officials consider PILOTs a tool to keep revenues in their district. Sentiments from this 
survey respondent are similar to those shared by the La Porte ISD superintendent quoted 
in Chapter 3. The qualitative data illustrate a perception among some administrators that 
PILOTs and the Chapter 313 program allow Chapter 41 districts to “keep” their own local 
money in their district. 
The quantitative data support this narrative, and show that Chapter 41 status is 
predictive of participation, but only early in the program. However, the effect is large. It is 
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unclear why the effect would only be present early in the program. It is possible that a 
programmatic change over the course of the full study period produced either a decline in 
Chapter 41 district participation, or an increase in non-Chapter 41 districts. In 2007, for 
example, the Legislature expanded Chapter 313 eligibility to include nuclear, internal 
gasification, and ultra-clean energy projects. Perhaps this created an opportunity for more 
diverse districts to participate. In 2009, the Legislature limited PILOTs to $100 per student 
per year. Perhaps this limitation on PILOTs muted the incentive for Chapter 41 schools, 
reducing their participation. More research is required to better understand the period 
effects. 
These quantitative findings, combined with the survey data, point to a contradiction 
between the state’s wealth equalization objectives in the school finance system and its 
economic development policy. This, combined with Finding 1 on industrial property 
wealth, points to the need for further research on how Chapter 313 affects equity in the 
school finance system. Further research should be conducted to better understand how 
these two policies interact and whether the program is undermining educational objectives. 
 Urban status is also related to program participation early in the program’s lifespan 
(2003-2007). Urban status is not related to participation in later years. Once again, this shift 
could be due to expanded program eligibility during the study period. In particular, ultra-
clean energy projects were added to the list of eligible sectors in 2007, opening up the 
program to participation from wind energy projects, most of which require large swaths of 
land and are located in rural West Texas. This is one potential explanation, though further 
research would be required to confirm this hypothesis. 
The finding on urban status is similar to Dalehite’s. Dalehite finds that population 
density is associated with abatement participation early on, but less so in later years. He 
attributes this, in part, to the flight of industrial manufacturing from the cities to the suburbs 
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and outskirts of urban areas. Another possible explanation is the natural proliferation of 
abatements over time. The copycat hypothesis would propose that districts, over time, 
increasingly adopt abatements in order to compete with neighboring districts. 
FINDING 3 
Abatement Participation Does Not Predict Industrial Investment 
The ultimate aim of this study has been to understand whether granting tax 
abatements is associated with an increase in the industrial property tax base, and what the 
implications are for school finance. The industrial tax base acts as a proxy for industrial 
firm siting and provides valuable information about whether the program is producing the 
desired economic benefit for school districts.  
The quantitative findings from this report show no statistically significant effect on 
firm siting, holding a host of other variables equal across districts. The quantitative findings 
do not (nor can they) conclusively prove the absence of a relationship. The oft-cited maxim 
holds true that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. However, given the 
observable program data and study design, I do not locate evidence of a relationship 
between abatement participation and growth in industrial proeprty values. The regression 
results have a very low levels of statistical significance. We cannot reject the possibility 
that abatements have zero effect on industrial property values over time.  
Significant policy implication can be drawn from this finding. Districts are 
effectively “spending” state school finance dollars by granting abatements to firms. These 
abatements, however, appear to have no discernable effect on a firm’s decision to locate 
within that district. This study finds no evidence that abatements have an effect on 
industrial property growth, which means that districts are potentially omitting millions of 
dollars of industrial property from their tax rolls unnecessarily. Importantly, the state 
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school finance system internalizes full cost for this program by continuing to pay the same 
level of state aid to participating districts. Districts are not forced to pay for the costs of 
these unnecessary abatements. 
As emphasized before, no study can conclusively rule out the possibility of a 
relationship between abatements and industrial investment. However, with the tools 
available today for evidence-based policymaking, it is worth inquiring whether the state 
should spend billions of dollars on a program for which no empirical evidence exists 
demonstrating its efficacy. Although districts offering abatements may point anecdotally 
to rising industrial property values and new firm sitings in their districts, results from this 
study show that any apparent gains may not be attributable to the tax abatements, but rather 
to changes in population share or other unobserved variables. While some literature 
suggests that abatements may be effective intra-regionally, this study shows that even at 
the district level there is no evidence of a relationship.  
Neither the selection nor outcome model in this study take PILOTs into account. 
Districts often receive PILOTs as a condition for granting an abatement. Therefore, even 
if the abatement produces no growth in the property tax base, districts remain incentivized 
to grant abatements. The state, however, still loses out because that money is not accounted 
for in the school finance system or in Chapter 41 recapture calculations. 
While this study finds no evidence of a relationship between industrial investment 
and abatements, some school district board members and administrators maintain a strong 
belief that abatements drive investment. Five out of seven superintendents who answered 
this survey question said that they supported one or more abatement agreements in order 
to increase the property tax base of the district. Six out of seven, moreover, identified 
“increased revenues from an expanded tax base” as a benefit of the abatement program for 
their district. Four out of four board presidents said they entered into the abatement in order 
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to increase the property tax base, while four out of four cited this as a benefit for their 
district. 
In conclusion, there is insufficient evidence to claim that abatements produce the 
desired industrial investment at the district level. As discussed in Chapter 4, this finding is 
subject to some potential biases which bear repeating in this section. First, this analysis 
does not consider abatements that school districts may have entered into prior to 2002. It 
is possible that some districts had existing abatement agreements from Chapter 312. It is 
also possible for any existing agreements to affect program participation or industrial 
property investment. Further research should be done to eliminate pre-2002 abatements as 
a causal variable in industrial property value growth. 
As a final caveat, low levels of statistical significance may be attributable to a 
misspecified model. There could be nonlinear relationships at play that make some 
variables appear less important than they actually. Modeling additional interactive terms 
would be necessary to determine whether nonlinearity could be a source of error in the 
outcome model. 
In conclusion, however, findings one through three suggest that the state should 
consider the distributional consequences of Chapter 313 program participation and its 
implications for wealth equalization in the school finance system. The state may wish to 
reevaluate components of the program, such as PILOTs, that incentivize Chapter 41 
districts to participate, or conduct a more intensive distributional analysis of the benefits 
and burdens of property tax abatements. Additionally, the state may wish to perform 
additional program evaluations to determine whether the program is actually causing firms 
to invest in districts where they would not otherwise go. This study finds no evidence that 
the program affects industrial property investment. This is a concern given that the state is 
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currently paying over $90,000 per job “created” under the Chapter 313 program – jobs that 
might have been created and come to the district regardless of the incentive. 
FINDING 4: MORE QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH IS NEEDED 
A literature review on school property tax abatements revealed little to no research 
on this class of abatements. Moreover, it appears that – apart from this and Dalehite’s study 
– there have been few attempts at a quantitatively rigorous economic evaluation of the 
program. If the state of Texas wishes to adopt positive program reforms, it may be 
beneficial to understand more about how the program is working, which would include 
quantitative evaluation and qualitative studies on districts’ experience with the program. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, one of the difficulties in reforming the program is the high level 
of support that the program garners from districts. Understanding the perceptions that 
undergird their support will be helpful when proposing pragmatic reforms. 
In findings one through three, I present some limited data from my survey of school 
district officials. I present data where it corroborated quantitative findings, and thus where 
I felt it could contribute to a larger narrative. Given the low response rate for the survey, I 
do not wish to make inferences from survey responses alone. However, district officials 
did share valuable insights, and in this section I will highlight some trends in the survey 
data that may inform future research. The following highlights from my survey research 
should be further explored, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The following responses 
come from officials in districts that participate in the Chapter 313 program. 
Survey Theme 1: District Officials Are Familiar with Chapter 313 
 All ten superintendents and all five school board presidents said that they had heard 
of Chapter 313 before the survey. Fourteen district officials said they were familiar or very 
familiar with the program. Only one official said they were somewhat unfamiliar with 
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Chapter 313. Officials in participating districts appear to be aware of the program and 
demonstrate some substantive knowledge about its operation. 
Survey Theme 2: District Officials Are in Favor of Chapter 313 
Four out of four school board presidents and seven out of seven superintendents 
voted to approve (or otherwise supported) all abatement agreements considered during 
their time representing the district. No district official reported voting against, or otherwise 
not supporting, an abatement. The majority of participants said that the program brought 
net benefits to their district. 
Survey Theme 3: Beliefs about Property Tax Growth, PILOTs, Chapter 41 Status, and 
Jobs Creation Influence Participation 
District officials frequently cited the following as motivating factors to adopt an 
abatement agreement: property tax base expansion, PILOTs, Chapter 41 status, and job 
creation. 
Survey Theme 4: Chapter 313 Funds District Capital Investment 
Several superintendents shared that their district would not be able to afford certain 
capital or infrastructure improvements without the program. The following are quotes from 
those survey participants: 
Increased values allow flexibility to pass a bond to revitalize district 
infrastructure and make capital improvements. 
Made the possibility of revitalizing infrastructure and making capital 
improvements. 
As a district, our primary interest in the agreements was to increase 
our taxable values enough to make remodeling our school (or 
constructing a new campus) a realistic possibility for our taxpayers. 
Without the added values, our district would NEVER be able to afford 
the costs of a remodel or new campus -- and all of our campus 
buildings predate 1968 - most predate 1955. 
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Survey Theme 4: Chapter 313 is Complex and Districts Require Administrative 
Assistance to Participate 
 Several survey participants shared that the program is difficult to understand and 
administer. One participant shared their experience of requiring consulting assistance to 
understand the program: 
While we are a small, rural, property-poor school district lacking the 
infrastructure to analyze and effectuate this type of governmental 
binding agreement, we experienced no shortage of supports existing 
from legal counsel (Walsh Gallegos) and financial consultant (Moak 
Casey) existing to ensure all the proper consideration and steps are set 
in place. Without these instrumental members of this agreement, I am 
certain this process could have become burdensome. 
 This quote suggests that rural, property-poor schools may require more assistance 
to participate in the program than wealthier urban districts. This may be one explanation 
for patterns in program participation, especially among urban districts early in the program. 
Another participant shared, regarding administration: 
The Comptroller's Office and their rules complicate the process 
immensely. Agreements take a long time to complete and involve an 
enormous legal team. 
Future research may desire to quantify the amount of local revenue that goes toward 
Chapter 313 administration and consulting services, including the lobbying services that 
some districts employ to advocate for Chapter 313 during legislative session.  
These themes, demonstrated by the survey data, may serve as a launching point for 
future research inquiries. Due to the small sample size, readers should not make inferences 
about the program as a whole only from this survey data. Additional research, both 
quantitative and qualitative, would add to the state’s understanding of how the program 
may contribute to inequities in the school finance system and whether the program 
effectively advances the state’s economic development objectives. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
This report has explored the relationship between tax abatements, property wealth, 
and industrial firm investment. Drawing on Dalehite’s 2005 study on the Indiana school 
property tax abatement program, I use a quasi-experimental, propensity score matching 
research design to identify variables that influence school districts’ participation in the 
Chapter 313 program in Texas and evaluate the effect of abatements on industrial property 
investment. 
Through this methodology, I find that existing industrial property wealth predicts 
Chapter 313 participation. Chapter 41 and urban status strongly predict participation during 
the program’s early years from 2003-2007. These trends represent potential sources of 
inequity in the school finance system, as wealthier districts are more likely to opt into the 
state-subsidized program. Moreover, these schools are able to accept supplemental PILOT 
payments directly from firms that are not accounted for in the school property tax system.  
Survey responses corroborate quantitative finding that Chapter 41 districts have 
strong incentives to participate in the program. PILOTs, in particular, appear to create a 
strong incentive for Chapter 41 schools to participate. These findings suggest that the state 
may wish to evaluate its allowance of PILOTs, as well as its policy to exempt abated 
proeprty values from the state school aid formulas – a policy which grants an indirect 
subsidy to participating districts by allowing them to maintain their level of state school 
aid, despite their growing property tax base. The state may wish to consider whether the 
program’s design contradicts the state’s wealth equalization objectives. 
After controlling for variables influencing selection into the program, results fail to 
provide evidence of a relationship between abatements and industrial property tax growth. 
A large percentage of survey respondents indicated that growing the property tax base was 
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a primary objective for granting abatements. However, this study shows no evidence that 
Chapter 313 produces this desired result.  
This finding has important policy implications. The state currently invests billions 
of dollars into Chapter 313, representing a loss to the state’s school finance system. This 
study provides no evidence that this investment is producing the desired industrial 
investment at the district level. The state should reconsider whether it wishes to invest 
billions of dollars into a program for which there is little empirical evidence demonstrating 
its efficacy. 
Results from the analysis call into question the purported benefits of the abatement 
program, and suggest the potential for Chapter 313 to exacerbate inequities in the state 
school finance system. Despite only anecdotal evidence of efficacy, program features such 
as PILOTs and state reimbursement through the school aid formulas provide strong 
incentives for districts to continue their participation. Most respondents, in a survey of 
Chapter 313 districts, expressed support for the program and felt that it was conferring net 
benefits to their district. Property value growth, PILOTs, Chapter 41 status and jobs were 
frequently cited as motivators for granting an abatement. One superintendent, however, 
shared the following sentiment, highlighting a tension associated with Chapter 313 
participation: 
Blessed to live in a part of the state that doesn't require abatements to 
be attractive.  More important to improve academic progress in the 
district as a draw for business 
The Chapter 313 program provides strong incentives for schools to participate, 
especially if the district lacks other amenities to attract firms. However, this superintendent 
highlights one crux of the dilemma for Chapter 313 schools, which is that efforts to attract 
business are expensive to the state public school system and arguably undermine one of 
  111 
the state’s greatest draws for business: a well-educated workforce. Well-informed 
policymaking should explore not only the purported effects of one program, but its costs 
and benefits relative to alternative policies or investments. Given the potentially 
problematic effects of Chapter 313, the state may choose to consider the costs and benefits 
of alternative economic development investments – one of which may be increased 
financial support for public education. 
According to this study, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that abatements 
influence industrial property investment at the district level. However, this research is 
subject to limitations inherent in statistical program evaluation. Further research may be 
undertaken to explore alternative modeling approaches, or to further evaluate causal 
explanations for some of the trends identified in this report. This report will hopefully serve 
as a first step for researchers and the state of Texas to evaluate the efficacy of Chapter 313 
in achieving the state’s economic development objectives and its potentially deleterious 
effects on public school finance in Texas. 
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Appendix: Data Sources 
CHAPTER 313 ABATEMENT DATA (2002-2014) 
At the direction of the Comptroller, I created a comprehensive dataset on abatement 
participation by combining the agreement files available on the Comptroller’s Texas Ahead 
website with two supplemental data files that I obtained from a public information request 
to the Texas Comptroller’s Office. The supplemental data were used to create a 
comprehensive dataset that included all historical abatements, including those that districts 
adopted but have since expired. I cross-referenced the following datasets to ensure 
consistency, eliminate inactive agreements, and ensure comprehensiveness over the 
duration of the program to date. Data sources include: 
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts. (2016). Chapter 313 Application Status 1_20_15 
[data file]. Retrieved by public information request. 
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts. (2016). Application Status as of June 2014 for 
PIR [data file]. Retrieved by pubic information request. 
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts. (2015). CPA_active_agreement_list [data file]. 
Texas Ahead. Retrieved from 
http://www.texasahead.org/tax_programs/chapter313/applicants/.  
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts. (2015). CPA_inactive_agreement_list [data file]. 
Texas Ahead. Retrieved from 
http://www.texasahead.org/tax_programs/chapter313/applicants/. 
TAX RATE (2002-2014) 
 I obtained tax rate data for the study period from public information requests to 
both the Texas Education Agency and the Texas Office of the Comptroller. Data from the 
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Comptroller’s office were from the office’s annual Property Value Study. Data were 
consistent between the two sources. Data sources include: 
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts (2014). 2002 ISD Worksheet Export Detail [data 
file]. Retrieved by public information request.  
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts (2014). 2003 ISD Worksheet Export Detail [data 
file]. Retrieved by public information request.  
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts (2014). 2007 ISD Worksheet Export Detail [data 
file]. Retrieved by public information request.  
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts (2014). 2008 ISD Worksheet Export Detail [data 
file]. Retrieved by public information request.  
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts (2016). 2014 Final ISD Summary Worksheet Export 
Summary [data file]. Retrieved by public information request.  
Texas Education Agency. (2015). PIR 26052_slfrpt files DATA [data file]. Retrieved by 
public information request. 
TOTAL TAXABLE VALUE PER PUPIL (2002 AND 2007) 
I calculate total taxable value per pupil using data from both the Texas 
Comptroller’s office and the Texas Education Agency. Total taxable value per district 
comes from the Comptroller’s final Property Value Study findings, which are used as the 
foundation for state school aid calculations and are informed by self-reporting from 
districts. The Property Value Study provides figures for total taxable value per district. I 
submitted a public information request to the Comptroller’s office to obtain historical data. 
I then divided total taxable value per district by the average number of students in 
daily attendance (referred to as “Total Students” in the data description appendices), 
which I obtain from publicly available data on the Texas Education Agency website. For 
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Texas Education Agency data, please see the data definition appendices, as well. Data 
sources include: 
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts (2014). 2002 ISD Worksheet Export Detail [data 
file]. Retrieved by public information request.  
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts (2014). 2007 ISD Worksheet Export Detail [data 
file]. Retrieved by public information request.  
Texas Education Agency. (2012). district [2001-2002 data file]. Retrieved from 
https://rptsvr1.tea.texas.gov/perfreport/snapshot/download.html.  
Texas Education Agency. (2012). district [2006-2007 data file]. Retrieved from 
https://rptsvr1.tea.texas.gov/perfreport/snapshot/download.html.  
Texas Education Agency. (2002). “Appendices: Item Definitions,” in Snapshot 2002: 
2001-2002. Retrieved from 
https://rptsvr1.tea.texas.gov/perfreport/snapshot/2002/pdf/snap027.pdf.  
Texas Education Agency. (2007-2012). Snapshot 2007: Item Definitions. Retrieved from 
https://rptsvr1.tea.texas.gov/perfreport/snapshot/2007/itemdef.html.  
ASSESSED RESIDENTIAL AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY PER PUPIL (2002-2014) 
As with total taxable value per pupil, I used data from the Comptroller’s Property 
Value Study and publicly available information on total students per district to compute 
the assessed residential and industrial property per pupil. The Property Value Study 
contains a breakout of assessed residential and industrial property, specifically. In order to 
identify the appropriate variables and accompanying columns in the Property Value Study 
files, I referenced the Comptroller’s property classification guide. See the reference below. 
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I only used data on assessed residential property for 2002 and 2007. However, as 
assessed industrial property is included in both the selection and outcome model, I used 
data for years 2002, 2003, 2007, 2008, and 2014. Data sources include: 
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts (2014). 2002 ISD Worksheet Export Detail [data 
file]. Retrieved by public information request.  
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts (2014). 2003 ISD Worksheet Export Detail [data 
file]. Retrieved by public information request.  
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts (2014). 2007 ISD Worksheet Export Detail [data 
file]. Retrieved by public information request.  
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts (2014). 2008 ISD Worksheet Export Detail [data 
file]. Retrieved by public information request.  
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts (2016). 2014 Final ISD Summary Worksheet Export 
Summary [data file]. Retrieved by public information request.  
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts. (2014). Texas Property Tax Assistance Property 
Classification Guide: Reports of Property Value.  
Texas Education Agency. (2012). district [2001-2002 data file]. Retrieved from 
https://rptsvr1.tea.texas.gov/perfreport/snapshot/download.html.  
Texas Education Agency. (2012). district [2002-2003 data file]. Retrieved from 
https://rptsvr1.tea.texas.gov/perfreport/snapshot/download.html.  
Texas Education Agency. (2012). district [2006-2007 data file]. Retrieved from 
https://rptsvr1.tea.texas.gov/perfreport/snapshot/download.html.  
Texas Education Agency. (2012). district [2007-2008 data file]. Retrieved from 
https://rptsvr1.tea.texas.gov/perfreport/snapshot/download.html 
Texas Education Agency. (2015). district [2013-2014 data file]. Retrieved from 
https://rptsvr1.tea.texas.gov/perfreport/snapshot/download.html 
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Texas Education Agency. (2002). “Appendices: Item Definitions,” in Snapshot 2002: 
2001-2002. Retrieved from 
https://rptsvr1.tea.texas.gov/perfreport/snapshot/2002/pdf/snap027.pdf.  
Texas Education Agency. (2007-2012). Snapshot 2003: Item Definitions. Retrieved from 
https://rptsvr1.tea.texas.gov/perfreport/snapshot/2003/itemdef.html.  
Texas Education Agency. (2007-2012). Snapshot 2007: Item Definitions. Retrieved from 
https://rptsvr1.tea.texas.gov/perfreport/snapshot/2007/itemdef.html.  
Texas Education Agency. (2007-2012). Snapshot 2008: Item Definitions. Retrieved from 
https://rptsvr1.tea.texas.gov/perfreport/snapshot/2008/itemdef.html.  
Texas Education Agency. (2007-2012). Snapshot 2014: Item Definitions. Retrieved from 
https://rptsvr1.tea.texas.gov/perfreport/snapshot/2014/itemdef.html.  
URBAN STATUS 
I use the uniform classifications provided by the Texas Education Agency. I 
obtained historical classification data by public information request. Data sources include: 
Texas Education Agency. (2016). taxvals29DEC2015 [data file]. Retrieved by 
public information request. 
PERCENT OF STUDENTS EDUCATIONALLY DISADVANTAGED 
This refers to the percentage that are eligible for free or reduced price lunch as part 
of the National School Lunch Program. I obtained public data from the Texas Educational 
Agency on the agency’s website. Data sources include: 
Texas Education Agency. (2012). district [2001-2002 data file]. Retrieved from 
https://rptsvr1.tea.texas.gov/perfreport/snapshot/download.html.  
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Texas Education Agency. (2012). district [2006-2007 data file]. Retrieved from 
https://rptsvr1.tea.texas.gov/perfreport/snapshot/download.html.  
Texas Education Agency. (2002). “Appendices: Item Definitions,” in Snapshot 2002: 
2001-2002. Retrieved from 
https://rptsvr1.tea.texas.gov/perfreport/snapshot/2002/pdf/snap027.pdf.  
Texas Education Agency. (2007-2012). Snapshot 2007: Item Definitions. Retrieved from 
https://rptsvr1.tea.texas.gov/perfreport/snapshot/2007/itemdef.html.  
CHANGE IN FEDERAL FUNDING PER PUPIL (1997-2002, 2002-2007) 
I calculated the dollar change in federal funding per pupil from 1997-2002 or 2002-
2007, reported in inflation-adjusted dollars for the 2002 and 2007 study periods, 
respectively. I then divided this by the number of pupils in 2002 or 2007, respectively. I 
obtained data from the Texas Education Agency’s public website. Data sources include: 
Texas Education Agency. (2012). district [2001-2002 data file]. Retrieved from 
https://rptsvr1.tea.texas.gov/perfreport/snapshot/download.html.  
Texas Education Agency. (2012). district [2006-2007 data file]. Retrieved from 
https://rptsvr1.tea.texas.gov/perfreport/snapshot/download.html.  
Texas Education Agency. (2002). “Appendices: Item Definitions,” in Snapshot 2002: 
2001-2002. Retrieved from 
https://rptsvr1.tea.texas.gov/perfreport/snapshot/2002/pdf/snap027.pdf.  
Texas Education Agency. (2007-2012). Snapshot 2007: Item Definitions. Retrieved from 
https://rptsvr1.tea.texas.gov/perfreport/snapshot/2007/itemdef.html.  
CHAPTER 312 AGREEMENTS (2002 AND 2007) 
I obtained data on the number of Chapter 312 property tax abatement agreements 
that were active in cities and counties by public information request to the Comptroller’s 
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Office. I matched school districts to specific cities and counties using the Texas Education 
Agency educational directory. If a Chapter 312 abatement is in a jurisdiction that covers 
multiple school districts, I assign each district within the jurisdiction a point for the 
abatement. Data sources include: 
Texas Office of the Comptroller. (2016). TA Log-02 [data file]. Report. Retrieved by public 
information request. 
Texas Office of the Comptroller. (2016). TA Log-07 [data file]. Report. Retrieved by public 
information request. 
Texas Education Agency. (2016). TEDDirectory_160103 [data file]. Retrieved from 
http://mansfield.tea.state.tx.us/tea.askted.web/Forms/Home.aspx.  
CHAPTER 41 STATUS 
The Texas Education Agency provides data on districts’ Chapter 41 status and the 
recapture amount. This information is publicly available on the agency’s website. Data 
source includes: 
Texas Education Agency. (2015). TEA_1994–2016 Chapter 41 Recapture Paid by 
District. Retrieved at 
http://tea.texas.gov/Finance_and_Grants/State_Funding/Chapter_41_Wealth_Equ
alization/Chapter__41_Wealth_Equalization/.  
CHANGE IN EXPENDITURES PER PUPIL 
I calculated the change in expenditures per pupil, adjusting for inflation to the last 
year in each study period. Expenditure per pupil is available from the Texas Education 
Agency. Expenditure data are reported for the year prior to the data label. For example, 
the 2013-2014 dataset reports expenditure data for the 2012-2013 year. These were the 
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most recent data available. I used these data despite their not aligning perfectly with the 
beginning and end of each study period. Data sources include:   
Texas Education Agency. (2012). district [2001-2002 data file]. Retrieved from 
https://rptsvr1.tea.texas.gov/perfreport/snapshot/download.html.  
Texas Education Agency. (2012). district [2002-2003 data file]. Retrieved from 
https://rptsvr1.tea.texas.gov/perfreport/snapshot/download.html.  
Texas Education Agency. (2012). district [2006-2007 data file]. Retrieved from 
https://rptsvr1.tea.texas.gov/perfreport/snapshot/download.html.  
Texas Education Agency. (2012). district [2007-2008 data file]. Retrieved from 
https://rptsvr1.tea.texas.gov/perfreport/snapshot/download.html 
Texas Education Agency. (2015). district [2013-2014 data file]. Retrieved from 
https://rptsvr1.tea.texas.gov/perfreport/snapshot/download.html 
CHANGE IN EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 
I calculated the change in the percentage of adults over the age of 25 who have a 
high school degree or more. I used American Community Survey (ACS) and Decennial 
Census data. Due to large margins of error, the US Census Bureau now only provides 
district-level data as 5-year estimates, while earlier estimates are only available at the 3-
year level because the census had not yet begun to produce 5-year estimates. Therefore, I 
elected to use Decennial Census data as the starting point for the earlier period, since it is 
not subject to margins of error, and compare it to the current standard of 5-year estimates. 
Data sources include: 
U.S. Census Bureau. Decennial Census. Census 2000, using Social Explorer. 
U.S. Census Bureau. American Community Survey. ACS 2009 (5-year Estimates), using 
Social Explorer. 
  120 
U.S. Census Bureau. American Community Survey. ACS 2014 (5-year Estimates), using 
Social Explorer. 
CHANGE IN CHILD POVERTY RATE (2003-2007, 2003-2014, 2008-2014) 
I used the Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE) to calculate the 
change in the percentage of children ages 5 to 17 who are living in families below the 
poverty line. Data sources include: 
U.S. Census Bureau. Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates. Table 1: School district 
estimates (2003, 2007, 2008, 2014). Retrieved from 
https://www.census.gov/did/www/saipe/data/schools/index.html. 
CHANGE IN SHARE OF STATE POPULATION (2003-2007, 2003-2014, 2008-2014) 
I used SAIPE to calculate the change in districts’ share of state population over the 
study period. Data sources include 
U.S. Census Bureau. Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates. Table 1: School 
district estimates (2003, 2007, 2008, 2014). Retrieved from 
https://www.census.gov/did/www/saipe/data/schools/index.html  
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